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_______________ 
 
OPINION 
_______________ 
 
SMITH, Circuit Judge, with whom McKEE, Chief 
Judge, SLOVITER, SCIRICA, RENDELL, AMBRO, 
FUENTES, FISHER, and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges 
join. 
 
 Once again, we are asked to find the balance 
between a student’s right to free speech and a school’s 
need to control its educational environment.  In this case, 
two middle-school students purchased bracelets bearing 
the slogan “I ♥ boobies! (KEEP A BREAST)” as part of 
a nationally recognized breast-cancer-awareness 
campaign.  The Easton Area School District banned the 
bracelets, relying on its authority under Bethel School 
District No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986), to 
restrict vulgar, lewd, profane, or plainly offensive speech, 
and its authority under Tinker v. Des Moines Independent 
Community School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969), to 
restrict speech that is reasonably expected to substantially 
disrupt the school.  The District Court held that the ban 
violated the students’ rights to free speech and issued a 
preliminary injunction against the ban. 
 We agree with the District Court that neither 
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Fraser nor Tinker can sustain the bracelet ban.  The 
scope of a school’s authority to restrict lewd, vulgar, 
profane, or plainly offensive speech under Fraser is a 
novel question left open by the Supreme Court, and one 
which we must now resolve.  We hold that Fraser, as 
modified by the Supreme Court’s later reasoning in 
Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007), sets up the 
following framework: (1) plainly lewd speech, which 
offends for the same reasons obscenity offends, may be 
categorically restricted regardless of whether it 
comments on political or social issues, (2) speech that 
does not rise to the level of plainly lewd but that a 
reasonable observer could interpret as lewd may be 
categorically restricted as long as it cannot plausibly be 
interpreted as commenting on political or social issues, 
and (3) speech that does not rise to the level of plainly 
lewd and that could plausibly be interpreted as 
commenting on political or social issues may not be 
categorically restricted.  Because the bracelets here are 
not plainly lewd and because they comment on a social 
issue, they may not be categorically banned under 
Fraser.  The School District has also failed to show that 
the bracelets threatened to substantially disrupt the school 
under Tinker.  We will therefore affirm the District 
Court. 
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I. 
A. Factual background 
As a “leading youth focused global breast cancer 
organization,” the Keep A Breast Foundation tries to 
educate thirteen- to thirty-year-old women about breast 
cancer.  Br. of Amicus Curiae KABF at 13.  To that end, 
it often partners with other merchants to co-brand 
products that raise awareness.  And because it believes 
that young women’s “negative body image[s]” seriously 
inhibit their awareness of breast cancer, the Foundation’s 
products often “seek[] to reduce the stigma by speaking 
to young people in a voice they can relate to.”  Id. at 14–
15.  If young women see such awareness projects and 
products as cool and trendy, the thinking goes, then they 
will be more willing to talk about breast cancer openly. 
To “start a conversation about that taboo in a light-
hearted way” and to break down inhibitions keeping 
young women from performing self-examinations, the 
Foundation began its “I ♥ Boobies!” initiative.  Id. at 20–
21.  Part of the campaign included selling silicone 
bracelets of assorted colors emblazoned with “I ♥ 
Boobies! (KEEP A BREAST)” and “check y♥urself! 
(KEEP A BREAST).”  Id. at 21–22.  The Foundation’s 
website address (www.keep-a-breast.org) and motto 
(“art. education. awareness. action.”) appear on the inside 
of the bracelet.  Id.   
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As intended, the “I ♥ Boobies” initiative was a hit 
with young women, quickly becoming one of the 
Foundation’s “most successful and high profile 
educational campaigns.”  Id. at 20–21.  Two of the young 
women drawn to the bracelets were middle-school 
students B.H. and K.M.  They purchased the bracelets 
with their mothers before the 2010–2011 school year—
B.H. because she saw “a lot of [her] friends wearing” the 
bracelets and wanted to learn about them, and K.M. 
because of the bracelet’s popularity and awareness 
message.  App. 72, 92, 106, 442. 
But the bracelets were more than just a new 
fashion trend.  K.M.’s purchase prompted her to become 
educated about breast cancer in young women.  The girls 
wore their bracelets both to commemorate friends and 
relatives who had suffered from breast cancer and to 
promote awareness among their friends.  Indeed, their 
bracelets started conversations about breast cancer and 
did so far more effectively than the more-traditional pink 
ribbon.  App. 73–74.  That made sense to B.H., who 
observed that “no one really notices” the pink ribbon, 
whereas the “bracelets are new and . . . more appealing to 
teenagers.”  App. 74.   
B.H., K.M., and three other students wore the “I ♥ 
boobies! (KEEP A BREAST)” bracelets at Easton Area 
Middle School during the 2010–2011 school year.  A few 
teachers, after observing the students wear the bracelets 
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every day for several weeks, considered whether they 
should take action.  The teachers’ responses varied: One 
found the bracelets offensive because they trivialized 
breast cancer.  Others feared that the bracelets might lead 
to offensive comments or invite inappropriate touching.  
But school administrators also believed that middle-
school boys did not need the bracelets as an excuse to 
make sexual statements or to engage in inappropriate 
touching.  See, e.g., Viglianti Test., App. 196, 198 
(testifying that such incidents “happened before the 
bracelets” and were “going to happen after the bracelets” 
because “sexual curiosity between boys and girls in the 
middle school is . . . a natural and continuing thing”). 
In mid- to late September, four or five teachers 
asked the eighth-grade assistant principal, Amy 
Braxmeier, whether they should require students to 
remove the bracelets.  The seventh-grade assistant 
principal, Anthony Viglianti, told the teachers that they 
should ask students to remove “wristbands that have the 
word ‘boobie’ written on them,” App. 343, even though 
there were no reports that the bracelets had caused any 
in-school disruptions or inappropriate comments.
1
 
                                              
1
 In mid-October before the ban was publicly announced, 
school administrators received some unrelated reports of 
inappropriate touching, but neither the word “boobies” 
nor the bracelets were considered a cause of these 
incidents. 
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With Breast Cancer Awareness Month 
approaching in October, school administrators 
anticipated that the “I ♥ boobies! (KEEP A BREAST)” 
bracelets might reappear.
2
  The school was scheduled to 
observe Breast Cancer Awareness Month on October 28, 
so the day before, administrators publicly announced, for 
the first time, the ban on bracelets containing the word 
“boobies.”  Using the word “boobies” in his 
announcement, Viglianti notified students of the ban over 
the public-address system, and a student did the same on 
the school’s television station.  The Middle School still 
encouraged students to wear the traditional pink, and it 
provided teachers who donated to Susan G. Komen for 
the Cure with either a pin bearing the slogan 
“Passionately Pink for the Cure” or a T-shirt reading 
“Real Rovers Wear Pink.”   
Later that day, a school security guard noticed 
B.H. wearing an “I ♥ boobies! (KEEP A BREAST)” 
bracelet and ordered her to remove it.  B.H. refused.  
After meeting with Braxmeier, B.H. relented, removed 
her bracelet, and returned to lunch.  No disruption 
occurred at any time that day. 
The following day, B.H. and K.M. each wore their 
“I ♥ boobies! (KEEP A BREAST)” bracelets to observe 
                                              
2
 The Middle School permits students to wear the 
Foundation’s “check y♥urself (KEEP A BREAST)” 
bracelets. 
11 
 
the Middle School’s Breast Cancer Awareness Day.  The 
day was uneventful—until lunchtime.  Once in the 
cafeteria, both girls were instructed by a school security 
guard to remove their bracelets.  Both girls refused.  
Hearing this encounter, another girl, R.T., stood up and 
similarly refused to take off her bracelet.  Confronted by 
this act of solidarity, the security guard permitted the 
girls to finish eating their lunches before escorting them 
to Braxmeier’s office.  Again, the girls’ actions caused no 
disruption in the cafeteria, though R.T. told Braxmeier 
that one boy had immaturely commented either that he 
also “love[d] boobies” or that he “love[d] her boobies.”   
Braxmeier spoke to all three girls, and R.T. agreed 
to remove her bracelet.  B.H. and K.M. stood firm, 
however, citing their rights to freedom of speech.  The 
Middle School administrators were having none of it.  
They punished B.H. and K.M. by giving each of them 
one and a half days of in-school suspension and by 
forbidding them from attending the Winter Ball.  The 
administrators notified the girls’ families, explaining only 
that B.H. and K.M. were being disciplined for 
“disrespect,” “defiance,” and “disruption.” 
News of the bracelets quickly reached the rest of 
the Easton Area School District, which instituted a 
district-wide ban on the “I ♥ boobies! (KEEP A 
BREAST)” bracelets, effective on November 9, 2010.  
The only bracelet-related incident reported by school 
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administrators occurred weeks after the district-wide ban: 
Two girls were talking about their bracelets at lunch 
when a boy who overheard them interrupted and said 
something like “I want boobies.”  He also made an 
inappropriate gesture with two red spherical candies.  
The boy admitted his “rude” comment and was 
suspended for one day.
3
 
This was not the first time the Middle School had 
banned clothing that it found distasteful.  Indeed, the 
School District’s dress-code policy prohibits “clothing 
imprinted with nudity, vulgarity, obscenity, profanity, 
and double entendre pictures or slogans.”4  Under the 
policy, seventh-grade students at the Middle School have 
been asked to remove clothing promoting Hooters and 
Big Pecker’s Bar & Grill, as well as clothing bearing the 
phrase “Save the ta-tas” (another breast-cancer-
awareness slogan).  Typically, students are disciplined 
only if they actually refuse to remove the offending 
apparel when asked to do so. 
B. Procedural history 
                                              
3
 After the district-wide ban was in place, there were 
several incidents of middle-school boys inappropriately 
touching girls, but they were unrelated to the “I ♥ 
boobies! (KEEP A BREAST)” bracelets. 
4
 B.H. and K.M. do not assert a facial challenge to the 
constitutionality of the dress-code policy. 
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Through their mothers, B.H. and K.M. sued the 
School District under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
5
  Compl., ECF 
No. 1 ¶ 3, B.H. v. Easton Area Sch. Dist., No. 5:10-CV-
06283-MAM (E.D. Pa. Nov. 15, 2010).  They sought a 
temporary restraining order allowing them to attend the 
Winter Ball and a preliminary injunction against the 
bracelet ban.  B.H. v. Easton Area Sch. Dist., 827 F. 
Supp. 2d 392, 394 (E.D. Pa. 2011).  At the District 
Court’s urging, the School District reversed course and 
permitted B.H. and K.M. to attend the Winter Ball while 
retaining the option to impose a comparable punishment 
if the bracelet ban was upheld.  Id.  The District Court 
accordingly denied the motion for a temporary 
restraining order.  Id.   
The District Court conducted an evidentiary 
hearing on the request for a preliminary injunction.  It 
soon became clear that the School District’s rationale for 
disciplining B.H. and K.M. had shifted.  Although B.H.’s 
and K.M.’s disciplinary letters indicated only that they 
were being disciplined for “disrespect,” “defiance,” and 
“disruption,” the School District ultimately based the ban 
                                              
5
 The District Court had both federal-question 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and § 1983 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3).  See Max v. 
Republican Comm. of Lancaster Cnty., 587 F.3d 198, 199 
n.1 (3d Cir. 2009). 
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on its dress-code policy
6
 together with the bracelets’ 
alleged sexual innuendo.  According to the School 
District’s witnesses, the Middle School assistant 
principals had conferred and concluded that the bracelets 
“conveyed a sexual double entendre” that could be 
harmful and confusing to students of different physical 
and sexual developmental levels.  Sch. Dist.’s Br. at 9.  
And the principals believed that middle-school students, 
who often have immature views of sex, were particularly 
likely to interpret the bracelets that way.  For its part, the 
Foundation explained that no one there “ever suggested 
that the phrase ‘I (Heart) Boobies!’ is meant to be sexy.”  
App. 150.  To that end, the Foundation had denied 
requests from truck stops, convenience stores, vending 
machine companies, and pornographers to sell the 
                                              
6
 Even the Middle School administrators seemed unsure 
which words would be prohibited by the dress code.  
When deposed, Viglianti and principal Angela DiVietro 
testified that the word “breast” (as in apparel stating 
“keep-a-breast.org” or “breast cancer awareness”) would 
be inappropriate because the word “breast” “can be 
construed as [having] a sexual connotation.”  App. 490, 
497.  At the District Court’s evidentiary hearing, they 
reversed course.  Viglianti stated that “keep-a-breast.org” 
would be appropriate “[i]n the context of Breast Cancer 
Awareness Month,” and DiVeitro no longer believed the 
phrase “breast cancer awareness” was vulgar to middle-
school students. 
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bracelets. 
After the evidentiary hearing, the District Court 
preliminarily enjoined the School District’s bracelet ban.  
According to the District Court, B.H. and K.M. were 
likely to succeed on the merits because the bracelets did 
not contain lewd speech under Fraser and did not 
threaten to substantially disrupt the school environment 
under Tinker.  The District Court could find no other 
basis for regulating the student speech at issue.  The 
School District appealed, and the District Court denied its 
request to stay the injunction pending this appeal. 
II. 
 Although the District Court’s preliminary 
injunction is not a final order, we have jurisdiction under 
28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1), which grants appellate 
jurisdiction over “[i]nterlocutory orders of the district 
courts . . . granting, continuing, modifying, refusing, or 
dissolving injunctions.”  See Sypniewski v. Warren Hills 
Reg’l Bd. of Educ., 307 F.3d 243, 252 n.10 (3d Cir. 
2002).  We review the District Court’s factual findings 
for clear error, its legal conclusions de novo, and its 
ultimate decision to grant the preliminary injunction for 
abuse of discretion.  Id. at 252.  Four factors determine 
whether a preliminary injunction is appropriate: 
(1) whether the movant has a reasonable 
probability of success on the merits; (2) 
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whether the movant will be irreparably 
harmed by denying the injunction; (3) 
whether there will be greater harm to the 
nonmoving party if the injunction is granted; 
and (4) whether granting the injunction is in 
the public interest. 
Id. (quoting Highmark, Inc. v. UPMC Health Plan, Inc., 
276 F.3d 160, 170 (3d Cir. 2001)).  The District Court 
concluded that all four factors weighed in favor of B.H. 
and K.M.  In school-speech cases, though, the first 
factor—the likelihood of success on the merits—tends to 
determine which way the other factors fall.  Id. at 258.  
Because the same is true here, we focus first on B.H. and 
K.M.’s burden to show a likelihood of success on the 
merits.  Id.  
III. 
 The School District defends the bracelet ban as an 
exercise of its authority to restrict lewd, vulgar, profane, 
or plainly offensive student speech under Fraser.  As to 
the novel question of Fraser’s scope, jurists seem to 
agree on one thing: “[t]he mode of analysis employed in 
Fraser is not entirely clear.”  Morse, 551 U.S. at 404.7  
                                              
7
 The rest of the Supreme Court’s student-speech 
jurisprudence might fairly be described as opaque.  See 
Morse, 551 U.S. at 418 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“I am 
afraid that our jurisprudence now says that students have 
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On this point, we think the Supreme Court’s student-
speech cases are more consistent than they may first 
appear.  As we explain, Fraser involved only plainly 
lewd speech.  We hold that, under Fraser, a school may 
also categorically restrict speech that—although not 
plainly lewd, vulgar, or profane—could be interpreted by 
a reasonable observer as lewd, vulgar, or profane so long 
as it could not also plausibly be interpreted as 
commenting on a political or social issue.  Because the “I 
♥ boobies! (KEEP A BREAST)” bracelets are not plainly 
lewd and express support for a national breast-cancer-
awareness campaign—unquestionably an important 
social issue—they may not be categorically restricted 
                                                                                                     
a right to speak in schools except when they do 
not . . . .”); id. at 430 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (“[C]ourts have described the tests 
these cases suggest as complex and often difficult to 
apply.”); see, e.g., Doninger v. Niehoff, 642 F.3d 334, 
353 (2d Cir. 2011) (“The law governing restrictions on 
student speech can be difficult and confusing, even for 
lawyers, law professors, and judges.  The relevant 
Supreme Court cases can be hard to reconcile, and courts 
often struggle with which standard applies in any 
particular case.”); Guiles ex rel. Guiles v. Marineau, 461 
F.3d 320, 326, 331 (2d Cir. 2006) (acknowledging “some 
lack of clarity in the Supreme Court’s student-speech 
cases” and stating that the “exact contours of what is 
plainly offensive [under Fraser] is not so clear”). 
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under Fraser. 
A. The Supreme Court’s decision in Fraser 
“[A]s a general matter, the First Amendment 
means that government has no power to restrict 
expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject 
matter, or its content.”  Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 
573 (2002).  Of course, there are exceptions.  When 
acting as sovereign, the government is empowered to 
impose time, place, and manner restrictions on speech, 
see Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 
(1989), make reasonable, content-based decisions about 
what speech is allowed on government property that is 
not fully open to the public, see Ark. Educ. Television 
Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 674–75 (1998), decide 
what viewpoints to espouse in its own speech or speech 
that might be attributed to it, see Johanns v. Livestock 
Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 560 (2005), and categorically 
restrict unprotected speech, such as obscenity, see Miller 
v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973).
8
 
                                              
8
 Other examples of categorically unprotected speech 
include child pornography, see New York v. Ferber, 458 
U.S. 747, 764–65 (1982), advocacy that imminently 
incites lawless action, see Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 
444, 447–48 (1969) (per curiam), fighting words, see 
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 
(1942), true threats, see Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 
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Sometimes, however, the government acts in 
capacities that go beyond being sovereign.  In those 
capacities, it not only retains its sovereign authority over 
speech but also gains additional flexibility to regulate 
speech.  See In re Kendall, 712 F.3d 814, 825 (3d Cir. 
2013) (collecting examples).  One of those other 
capacities is K-12 educator.  Although “students do not 
‘shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or 
expression at the schoolhouse gate,’” the First 
Amendment has to be “applied in light of the special 
characteristics of the school environment” and thus 
students’ rights to freedom of speech “are not 
automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in 
other settings.”  Morse, 551 U.S. at 396–97 (internal 
quotation marks and citations omitted). 
The Supreme Court first expressed this principle 
nearly a half century ago.  In 1965, the United States 
deployed over 200,000 troops to Vietnam as part of 
Operation Rolling Thunder—and thus began the Vietnam 
War.  That war “divided this country as few other issues 
[e]ver have.”  Tinker, 393 U.S. at 524 (Black, J., 
                                                                                                     
705, 708 (1969) (per curiam), commercial speech that is 
false, misleading, or proposes illegal transactions, see 
Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n 
of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 562, 566–67 (1980), and some 
false statements of fact, see United States v. Alvarez, 132 
S. Ct. 2537, 2546–47 (2012). 
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dissenting).   Public opposition to the war made its way 
into schools, and in one high-profile case, a group of 
high-school and middle-school students wore black 
armbands to express their opposition.  Id. at 504 
(majority opinion).  School officials adopted a policy 
prohibiting the armbands and suspending any student 
who refused to remove it when asked.  Id.  Some students 
refused and were suspended.  Id.  The Supreme Court 
upheld their right to wear the armbands.  Id. at 514.  
Tinker held that school officials may not restrict student 
speech without a reasonable forecast that the speech 
would substantially disrupt the school environment or 
invade the rights of others.  Id. at 513.  As nothing more 
than the “silent, passive expression of opinion, 
unaccompanied by any disorder or disturbance on [the 
students’] part,” the students’ armbands were protected 
by the First Amendment.  Id. at 508. 
Under Tinker’s “general rule,” the government 
may restrict school speech that threatens a specific and 
substantial disruption to the school environment or that 
“inva[des] . . . the rights of others.”9  Saxe v. State 
                                              
9
 We have not yet decided whether Tinker is limited to 
on-campus speech.  See J.S. v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 
650 F.3d 915, 926 & n.3 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc) 
(declining to reach this issue); see also id. at 936 (Smith, 
J., concurring) (“I write separately to address a question 
21 
 
College Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 211, 214 (3d Cir. 
2001) (citing Tinker, 393 U.S. at 504).  Since Tinker, the 
Supreme Court has identified three “narrow” 
circumstances in which the government may restrict 
student speech even when there is no risk of substantial 
disruption or invasion of others’ rights.  Id. at 212.  First, 
the government may categorically restrict vulgar, lewd, 
profane, or plainly offensive speech in schools, even if it 
would not be obscene outside of school.  Fraser, 478 
U.S. at 683, 685.  Second, the government may likewise 
restrict speech that “a reasonable observer would 
interpret as advocating illegal drug use” and that cannot 
“plausibly be interpreted as commenting on any political 
or social issue.”  Morse, 551 U.S. at 422 (Alito, J., 
concurring); see also id. at 403 (majority opinion) 
(“[T]his is plainly not a case about political debate over 
the criminalization of drug use or possession.”).10  And 
third, the government may impose restrictions on school-
sponsored speech that are “reasonably related to 
legitimate pedagogical concerns”—a power usually 
lumped together with the other school-specific speech 
doctrines but that, strictly speaking, simply reflects the 
government’s more general power as sovereign over 
                                                                                                     
that the majority opinion expressly leaves open: whether 
Tinker applies to off-campus speech in the first place.”). 
10
 As we explain in Part III.B(2), the limitations that 
Justice Alito’s concurrence places on the majority’s 
opinion in Morse are controlling. 
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government-sponsored speech.
11
  Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. 
                                              
11
 Compare Pleasant Grove City, Utah v. Summum, 555 
U.S. 460, 468 (2009) (discussing the government-speech 
doctrine and explaining that “[a] government entity may 
exercise this same freedom to express its views when it 
receives assistance from private sources for the purpose 
of delivering a government-controlled message” (citing 
Johanns, 544 U.S. at 562)), with Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 
271, 273 (reaffirming the government’s same authority to 
control speech that might be “reasonably perceive[ed] to 
bear the imprimatur of the school” in its role as K-12 
educator); see also Eugene Volokh, The First 
Amendment and the Government as K-12 Educator, The 
Volokh Conspiracy (Oct. 31, 2011, 6:26 PM), 
http://www.volokh.com/2011/10/31/the-first-
amendment-and-the-government-as-k-12-educator/ 
(“[Kuhlmeier] generally reflects broad government-as-
speaker law, and not special rules related to the 
government as K-12 educator.”); Michael J. O’Connor, 
Comment, School Speech in the Internet Age: Do 
Students Shed Their Rights When They Pick Up a 
Mouse?, 11 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 459, 469 (2009) 
(“Hazelwood . . . simply illustrates the idea that the 
school speech arena is not isolated from developments in 
wider First Amendment jurisprudence. . . .  Hazelwood 
recognizes that schools are government actors and 
therefore are entitled to control speech that could be 
reasonably viewed as originating with them.”); Gia B. 
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Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988). 
The first exception is at issue here.  We must 
determine the scope of the government’s authority to 
categorically restrict vulgar, lewd, indecent, or plainly 
offensive speech under Fraser.  Fraser involved a high-
school assembly during which a student “nominated a 
peer for class office through an ‘an elaborate, graphic, 
and explicit sexual metaphor.’”  Saxe, 240 F.3d at 212 
(quoting Fraser, 478 U.S. at 677).  Fraser’s speech 
“glorif[ied] male sexuality”: 
I know a man who is firm—he’s firm in his 
pants, he’s firm in his shirt, his character is 
firm—but most . . . of all, his belief in you, 
the students of Bethel, is firm. . . . Jeff 
Kuhlman [the candidate] is a man who takes 
his point and pounds it in.  If necessary, he’ll 
take an issue and nail it to the wall.  He 
doesn’t attack things in spurts, he drives hard, 
pushing and pushing until finally—he 
succeeds. . . . Jeff is a man who will go to the 
very end—even the climax, for each and 
every one of you. . . . So vote for Jeff for 
A.S.B. vice-president—he’ll never come 
between you and the best our high school can 
                                                                                                     
Lee, First Amendment Enforcement in Government 
Institutions and Programs, 56 UCLA L. Rev. 1691, 
1711–12 (2009) (similar).  
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be. 
Fraser, 478 U.S. at 687 (Brennan, J., concurring).  In 
response, “[s]ome students hooted and yelled; some by 
gestures simulated the sexual activities pointedly alluded 
to in [Fraser’s] speech.”  Id. at 678 (majority opinion).  
Still “[o]ther students appeared to be bewildered and 
embarrassed by the speech.”  Id.  The school suspended 
Fraser and took him out of the running for graduation 
speaker.  Id. 
The Supreme Court upheld Fraser’s suspension.  
Id. at 683.  Rather than requiring a reasonable forecast of 
substantial disruption under Tinker, the Court held that 
lewd, vulgar, indecent, and plainly offensive student 
speech is categorically unprotected in school, even if it 
falls short of obscenity and would have been protected 
outside school.  Saxe, 240 F.3d at 213 (discussing 
Fraser); Morse, 551 U.S. at 405 (“Had Fraser delivered 
the same speech in a public forum outside the school 
context, it would have been protected.”); Fraser, 478 
U.S. at 688 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (“If [Fraser] had 
given the same speech outside of the school environment, 
he could not have been penalized simply because 
government officials considered his language to be 
inappropriate.”).  For this proposition, the Court relied on 
precedent holding that the government can restrict 
expression that would be obscene from a minor’s 
perspective—even though it would not be obscene in an 
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adult’s view—where minors are either a captive audience 
or the intended recipients of the speech.  See Fraser, 478 
U.S. at 684–85 (relying on Ginsberg v. New York, 390 
U.S. 629, 635–37 & nn.4–5 (1968) (upholding criminal 
punishment for selling to minors any picture depicting 
nudity); Bd. of Educ., Island Trees Union Free Sch. Dist. 
No. 26 v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 870 (1982) (plurality 
opinion) (acknowledging that the Free Speech Clause 
would allow a local board of education to remove 
“pervasively vulgar” books from school libraries); and 
FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 749–50 (1978) 
(rejecting a Free Speech Clause challenge to the FCC’s 
broad leeway to regulate indecent-but-not-obscene 
material on broadcast television during hours when 
children were likely to watch)). 
Fraser did no more than extend these obscenity-to-
minors
12
 cases to another place where minors are a 
                                              
12
 See Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 
2735 (2011) (describing Ginsberg as regulating 
“obscenity for minors”); Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 
869 (1997) (reaffirming the government’s power under 
Pacifica and Ginsberg to “‘protect[] the physical and 
psychological well-being of minors’ which extended to 
shield them from indecent messages that are not obscene 
by adult standards” (quoting Sable Comm’cns of Cal., 
Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989))); Pacifica 
Found., 438 U.S. at 767 (Brennan, J., dissenting) 
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captive audience—schools.  Indeed, as the Court 
explained, schools are tasked with more than just 
“educating our youth” about “books, the curriculum, and 
the civics class.”  Id. at 681.  Society also expects schools 
to “teach[] students the boundaries of socially appropriate 
behavior,” including the “fundamental values of ‘habits 
and manners of civility’ essential to a democratic 
society.”  Id. at 681, 683 (citation omitted).  
Consequently, Fraser’s “sexually explicit monologue” 
was not protected.  Id. at 685. 
It is important to recognize what was not at stake 
in Fraser.  Fraser addressed only a school’s power over 
speech that was plainly lewd—not speech that a 
reasonable observer could interpret as either lewd or non-
lewd.  See, e.g., Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 49 (2d 
Cir. 2008) (“[Fraser’s] reference to ‘plainly offensive’ 
speech must be understood in light of the vulgar, lewd, 
and sexually explicit language that was at issue in [that] 
case.”); Chandler v. McMinnville Sch. Dist., 978 F.2d 
                                                                                                     
(agreeing with the majority that the government could 
regulate “variable obscenity” or “obscenity to minors” on 
broadcast television, but disagreeing with the majority 
that the Carlin monologue met that standard); Erznoznik 
v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 213 n.10 (1975) 
(describing Ginsberg as involving “obscenity as to 
minors”); Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 635 n.4 (using the label 
“variable obscenity”). 
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524, 530 (9th Cir. 1992) (interpreting Fraser as limited to 
“per se vulgar, lewd, obscene, or plainly offensive” 
school speech).  After all, the Court believed Fraser’s 
speech to be “plainly offensive to both teachers and 
students—indeed to any mature person.”13  Fraser, 478 
U.S. at 683.   
And because it was plainly lewd, the Court did not 
believe that Fraser’s speech could plausibly be 
interpreted as political or social commentary.  In 
hindsight, it might be tempting to believe that Fraser’s 
speech was political because it was made in the context 
of a student election.  Cf. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 
U.S. 310, 130 S. Ct. 876, 898 (2010) (describing the 
importance of political speech as the “means to hold 
                                              
13
 Of course, Fraser’s speech might “seem[] distinctly 
lacking in shock value” today, especially “from the 
perspective enabled by 25 years of erosion of refinement 
in the use of language.”  Zamecnik v. Indian Prairie Sch. 
Dist. No. 204, 636 F.3d 874, 877 (7th Cir. 2011); see also 
Fraser, 478 U.S. at 691 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting 
that Clark Gable’s famous use of the word “damn” in 
“Frankly, my dear, I don’t give a damn” “shocked the 
Nation” when Justice Stevens was a high school student 
but had become “less offensive” by the time of Fraser).  
Any such change in perspective, however, is irrelevant to 
our examination of the Court’s interpretation of Fraser’s 
speech and its reasoning.  
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officials accountable to the people”).  But that kind of 
revisionist history is belied by both the logic and 
language of Fraser.  “Fraser permits a school to prohibit 
words that ‘offend for the same reasons that obscenity 
offends.’”  Saxe, 240 F.3d at 213 (quoting Fraser, 478 
U.S. at 685).  Obscenity, in turn, offends because it is “no 
essential part of any exposition of ideas, and [is] of such 
slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that 
may be derived from [it] is clearly outweighed by the 
social interest in order and morality.”  Fraser, 478 U.S. 
at 683 (quoting Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. at 746 
(plurality opinion)).  In other words, obscenity and 
obscenity to minors, like “other historically unprotected 
categories of speech,” have little or no political or social 
value.  United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 130 S. Ct. 
1577, 1585 (2010).  By concluding that Fraser’s speech 
met the obscenity-to-minors standard, the Court 
necessarily implied that his speech could not be 
interpreted as having “serious” political value.  Miller, 
413 U.S. at 24.  
In fact, the majority in Fraser made this explicit.  
“[T]he Fraser [C]ourt distinguished its holding from 
Tinker in part on the absence of any political message in 
Fraser’s speech.”  Guiles ex rel. Guiles v. Marineau, 461 
F.3d 320, 326, 328 (2d Cir. 2006).  In the Court’s own 
words, there was a “marked distinction between the 
political ‘message’ of the armbands in Tinker and the 
sexual content of [Fraser’s] speech.”  Fraser, 478 U.S. at 
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680 (emphasis added); see also Defoe ex rel. Defoe v. 
Spiva, 625 F.3d 324, 332 (6th Cir. 2010) (“Tinker 
governs this case because by wearing clothing bearing 
images of the Confederate flag, Tom Defoe engaged in 
‘pure speech,’ which is protected by the First 
Amendment, and thus Fraser would not apply.”).  
Several courts of appeals have similarly interpreted 
Fraser.  Guiles, 461 F.3d at 326, 328; Newsom ex rel. 
Newsom v. Albemarle Cnty. Sch. Bd., 354 F.3d 249, 256 
(4th Cir. 2003) (explaining that Fraser “distinguish[ed] 
Tinker on the basis that the lewd, vulgar, and plainly 
offensive speech was ‘unrelated to any political 
viewpoint’ (quoting Fraser, 478 U.S. at 685)); Chandler, 
978 F.2d at 532 n.2 (Goodwin, J., concurring) 
(concluding that Fraser does not apply because “this case 
clearly involves political speech”).  And the Supreme 
Court later characterized Fraser’s reasoning the same 
way.  Morse, 551 U.S. at 404 (noting that Fraser was 
“plainly attuned” to the sexual, non-political “content of 
Fraser’s speech”).  In fact, Morse refused to “stretch[] 
Fraser” so far as to “encompass any speech that could fit 
under some definition of ‘offensive’” out of a fear that 
“much political and religious speech might be perceived 
as offensive to some.”  Id. at 409.  Fraser therefore 
involved plainly lewd speech that did not comment on 
political or social issues.   
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B. How far does a school’s authority under Fraser 
extend? 
The School District asks us to extend Fraser in at 
least two ways: to reach speech that is ambiguously lewd, 
vulgar, or profane and to reach speech on political or 
social issues.
14
  The first step is justified, but the second 
                                              
14
 Fraser differs from this case in a third way: Fraser 
involved speech at an official school assembly, whereas 
the School District’s bracelet ban extends to the entire 
school day, not just school-sponsored functions.  But like 
other courts of appeals, we do not think that this 
difference matters.  See, e.g., R.O. ex rel. Ochshorn v. 
Ithaca City Sch. Dist., 645 F.3d 533, 542 (2d Cir. 2011) 
(“[W]e have not interpreted Fraser as limited either to 
regulation of school-sponsored speech or to the spoken 
word.”); Chandler, 978 F.2d at 529 (concluding that 
restriction of vulgar, lewd, and plainly offensive speech 
under Fraser is not limited to speech “given at an official 
school assembly”); Bystrom by and through Bystrom v. 
Fridley High Sch., Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 14, 822 F.2d 
747, 753 (8th Cir. 1987) (“It is true that [Fraser] 
involved a speech given before a student assembly . . . . 
[But] [t]his possible difference, in our view, does not 
amount to a legal distinction making the Bethel rule 
inapplicable here.”).  As we explained, Fraser reflected 
an extension of the Court’s obscenity-to-minors 
jurisprudence, which permits the government to restrict 
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lewd speech to children where children are either a 
captive audience or the intended recipients of the speech.  
Children are just as much of a captive audience in the 
hallways, cafeteria, or locker rooms as they are in official 
school assemblies and classrooms.  Naturally, then, we 
have never described a school’s authority under Fraser 
as being limited to official school functions and 
classrooms.  See, e.g., J.S., 650 F.3d at 927 (“The first 
exception is set out in Fraser, which we interpreted to 
permit school officials to regulate “‘lewd,’ ‘vulgar,’ 
‘indecent,’ and ‘plainly offensive’ speech in school.” 
(emphasis in original) (quoting Saxe, 240 F.3d at 213)).  
Although Justice Brennan’s concurrence and Justice 
Stevens’s dissent in Fraser suggested that this difference 
might matter, nothing in the majority opinion endorsed 
their distinction.  See Fraser, 478 U.S. at 689 (Brennan, 
J., concurring) (opining that Fraser’s “speech may well 
have been protected had he given it in school but under 
different circumstances, where the school’s legitimate 
interests in teaching and maintaining civil public 
discourse were less weighty”); id. at 696 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) (“It seems fairly obvious that [Fraser’s] 
speech would be inappropriate in certain classroom and 
formal social settings.  On the other hand, in a locker 
room or perhaps in a school corridor the metaphor in the 
speech might be regarded as rather routine comment.”).  
Indeed, if Fraser were so limited, then a school’s 
authority under Fraser would largely merge with its 
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is not. 
1. Under Fraser, schools may restrict 
ambiguously lewd speech only if it cannot 
plausibly be interpreted as commenting on a 
social or political matter. 
Although Fraser involved plainly lewd, vulgar, 
profane, or offensive speech that “offends for the same 
reasons obscenity offends,” Saxe, 240 F.3d at 213 
(quoting Fraser, 478 U.S. at 685), student speech need 
not rise to that level to be restricted under Fraser.  We 
conclude that schools may also categorically restrict 
ambiguous speech that a reasonable observer could 
interpret as lewd, vulgar, profane, or offensive—unless, 
as explained below, the speech could also plausibly be 
interpreted as commenting on a political or social issue.  
After all, Fraser made clear that “the determination of 
what manner of speech in the classroom or in school 
assembly is inappropriate properly rests with the school 
board.”  478 U.S. at 683.  The Supreme Court’s three 
other student-speech cases suggest that courts should 
defer to a school’s decisions to restrict what a reasonable 
observer would interpret as lewd, vulgar, profane, or 
offensive.  See Morse, 551 U.S. at 403 (explaining that, 
                                                                                                     
power to reasonably regulate school-sponsored speech 
under Kuhlmeier, yet we have always viewed Fraser and 
Kuhlmeier as separate exceptions to Tinker.  See, e.g., 
J.S., 650 F.3d at 927. 
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under Tinker, courts determine whether school officials 
have “reasonably conclude[d]” that student speech will 
substantially disrupt the school); id. at 405 (explaining 
that, under Kuhlmeier, courts uphold a school’s 
reasonable, pedagogically related restrictions on speech 
that an observer could reasonably attribute to the school); 
id. at 422 (Alito, J., concurring) (explaining that schools 
may restrict student speech that could “reasonably be 
regarded as encouraging illegal drug use” and that could 
not plausibly be interpreted as commenting on a political 
or social issue).  This makes sense.  School officials 
know the age, maturity, and other characteristics of their 
students far better than judges do.  Our review is 
restricted to a cold and distant record.  And we must take 
into account that these same officials must often act 
“suddenly and unexpectedly” based on their experience.  
Id. at 409–10 (majority opinion); see, e.g., Walker-
Serrano ex rel. Walker v. Leonard, 325 F.3d 412, 416–17 
(3d Cir. 2003) (“There can be little doubt that speech 
appropriate for eighteen-year-old high school students is 
not necessarily acceptable for seven-year-old grammar 
school students.  Human sexuality provides the most 
obvious example of age-sensitive matter . . . .” (citing 
Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683–84)); Sypniewski, 306 F.3d at 
266 (“What is necessary in one school at one time will 
not be necessary elsewhere and at other times.”). 
It remains the job of judges, nonetheless, to 
determine whether a reasonable observer could interpret 
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student speech as lewd, profane, vulgar, or offensive.  
See Morse, 551 U.S. at 402 (taking the same approach 
with respect to the message of drug advocacy on 
Frederick’s banner); see also Christian Legal Soc’y 
Chapter of the Univ. of Cal. v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 
2988 (2010) (“This Court is the final arbiter of the 
question whether a public university has exceeded 
constitutional constraints, and we owe no deference to 
universities when we consider that question.”).  Whether 
a reasonable observer could interpret student speech as 
lewd, profane, vulgar, or offensive depends on the 
plausibility of the school’s interpretation in light of 
competing meanings; the context, content, and form of 
the speech; and the age and maturity of the students.  See, 
e.g., Chandler, 978 F.2d at 530 (analyzing the word 
“scab” on buttons worn by students during a teacher 
strike to determine whether it was a vulgar, offensive 
epithet or just “common parlance” and concluding that, at 
the motion-to-dismiss stage, Fraser did not apply).   
Although this is a highly contextual inquiry, 
several rules apply.  A reasonable observer would not 
adopt an acontextual interpretation, and the subjective 
intent of the speaker is irrelevant.  See Morse, 551 U.S. at 
401–02 (explaining that Frederick’s desire to appear on 
television “was a description of [his] motive for 
displaying the banner” and “not an interpretation of what 
the banner sa[id]”); see also Saxe, 240 F.3d at 216–17 
(noting that students’ intent to offend or disrupt does not 
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satisfy Tinker).  And Fraser is not a blank check to 
categorically restrict any speech that touches on sex or 
any speech that has the potential to offend.  See Morse, 
551 U.S. at 401, 409 (refusing to “stretch[] Fraser” so far 
as “to encompass any speech that could fit under some 
definition of ‘offensive’ and rejecting the argument that 
the “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS” message on Frederick’s 
banner could be banned under Fraser, even though it “is 
no doubt offensive to some”); accord Eugene Volokh, 
May ‘Jesus Is Not a Homophobe’ T-shirt Be Banned 
From Public High School As ‘Indecent’ And ‘Sexual’?, 
The Volokh Conspiracy (Apr. 4, 2012, 3:36 PM), 
http://www.volokh.com/2012/04/04/may-jesus-was-not-
a-homophobe-T-shirt-be-banned-from-public-high-
school-as-indecent-and-sexual/ (“But Fraser . . . hardly 
suggested that all speech on political and religious 
questions related to sexuality and sexual orientation 
could be banned from public high school.”).  After all, a 
school’s mission to mold students into citizens capable of 
engaging in civil discourse includes teaching students of 
sufficient age and maturity how to navigate debates 
touching on sex. 
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2. Fraser does not permit a school to restrict 
ambiguously lewd speech that can also 
plausibly be interpreted as commenting on a 
social or political issue. 
A school’s leeway to categorically restrict 
ambiguously lewd speech, however, ends when that 
speech could also plausibly be interpreted as expressing a 
view on a political or social issue.  Justices Alito and 
Kennedy’s concurrence in Morse adopted a similar 
protection for political speech that could be interpreted as 
illegal drug advocacy.  Their narrower rationale 
protecting political speech limits and controls the 
majority opinion in Morse, and it applies with even 
greater force to ambiguously lewd speech. 
Justice Alito’s concurrence, joined by Justice 
Kennedy, provided the crucial fourth and fifth votes in 
the five-to-four majority opinion.  But the two justices 
conditioned their votes on the “understanding that (1) 
[the majority opinion] goes no further than to hold that a 
public school may restrict speech that a reasonable 
observer would interpret as advocating illegal drug use 
and (2) it provides no support for any restriction of 
speech that can plausibly be interpreted as commenting 
on any political or social issue.”  Morse, 551 U.S. at 422 
(Alito, J., concurring); see id. at 425 (regarding the 
categorical regulation of non-political advocacy of 
ambiguous illegal drug advocacy “as standing at the far 
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reaches of what the First Amendment permits” and 
“join[ing] the opinion of the Court with the 
understanding that the opinion does not endorse any 
further extension”).  The purpose of Justice Alito’s 
concurrence was to “ensur[e] that political speech will 
remain protected within the school setting” (subject, as 
always, to Tinker’s substantial-disruption principle).  
Ponce v. Socorro Indep. Sch. Dist., 508 F.3d 765, 768 
(5th Cir. 2007).   
Because the votes of Justices Alito and Kennedy 
were necessary to the majority opinion and were 
expressly conditioned on their narrower understanding 
that speech plausibly interpreted as political or social 
commentary was protected from categorical regulation, 
that limitation is a binding part of Morse.  This 
conclusion requires a minor detour.  The most familiar 
situation in which we follow the narrowest rationale was 
expressed t by the Supreme Court in Marks v. United 
States: when “no single rationale explaining the result 
enjoys the assent of five Justices, the holding of the Court 
may be viewed as that position taken by those Members 
who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest 
grounds.”  430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (internal quotation 
marks and citations omitted).  But that situation is not the 
only one in which we tally the justices’ views and look 
for the narrowest rationale.  The Supreme Court and this 
Court have both applied the narrowest-grounds approach 
in circumstances beyond those posed by Marks, 
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including to determine holdings in majority opinions (not 
just plurality opinions involving “no single legal rationale 
explain[ing] the result”) 15 and to count even dissenting 
justices’ votes that, by definition, could not “explain the 
result” (not just the votes of those who “concurred in the 
judgments”).16  See United States v. Johnson, 467 F.3d 
56, 65 (1st Cir. 2006) (noting that the Supreme Court has 
“moved away” from adhering to the strict circumstances 
in Marks). 
And it makes sense that the limitations in Justice 
Alito’s concurrence would narrow the majority opinion.  
When an individual justice’s vote is not needed to form a 
majority, “the meaning of a majority opinion is to be 
found within the opinion itself” because “the gloss that 
an individual [j]ustice chooses to place upon it is not 
authoritative.”  McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 
                                              
15
  See discussion of Horn and Bishop infra pp. 30–33. 
16
 See, e.g., Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 746 
(1994) (combining the views of four dissenters and 
Justice Stewart in Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 U.S. 222 
(1980), to form a “holding”); Donovan, 661 F.3d at 182 
(“[W]e have looked to the votes of dissenting Justices if 
they, combined with votes from plurality or concurring 
opinions, establish a majority view on the relevant 
issue.”); Student Pub. Interest Research Grp. of N.J., Inc. 
v. AT&T Bell Labs., 842 F.2d 1436, 1451 & n.16 (3d Cir. 
1988) (same).   
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448 n.3 (1990) (Blackmun, J., concurring).  But when an 
individual justice joins the majority and is essential to 
maintaining the majority, and then writes separately, “the 
opinion is not a majority opinion except to the extent that 
it accords with his views.”  Id. at 462 n.3 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting).  Of course, that linchpin justice’s opinion 
“cannot add to what the majority opinion holds” by 
“binding the other four [j]ustices to what they have not 
said” because his views would not be the narrowest 
grounds.  Id.  But that justice’s separate opinion “can 
assuredly narrow what the majority opinion holds, by 
explaining the more limited interpretation adopted by that 
necessary member of the majority.”  Id.  In that case, the 
linchpin justice’s views are “the least common 
denominator” necessary to maintain a majority opinion.  
Id.; see generally Sonja R. West, Concurring in Part and 
Concurring in the Confusion, 104 Mich. L. Rev. 1951 
(2006) (advocating the same approach and explaining 
that it is consistent with determining precedent from the 
traditional Supreme Court’s seriatim opinions).   
Indeed, this is not the first time that we have been 
compelled to limit a majority opinion by a linchpin 
justice’s narrower concurrence.  In Horn v. Thoratec, we 
considered whether the federal regulation of medical 
devices preempts only state-law “requirement[s]” 
specific to medical devices or also preempts general 
common-law claims not specific to medical devices (such 
as negligence).  See 376 F.3d 163, 173–74 (3d Cir. 2004).  
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That, in turn, required us to analyze the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Medtronic v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996).  We 
read Part V of the Lohr majority opinion—which Justice 
Breyer formally joined as the fifth vote—as saying that 
only device-specific state-law requirements, not general 
common-law claims, are preempted.  See Horn, 376 F.3d 
at 174 (noting that the majority in Part V conclud[ed] that 
common-law claims “escape[]” preemption because 
“their generality leaves them outside” of the preempted 
category of device-specific requirements (quoting Lohr, 
518 U.S. at 502)); id. at 175 (explaining that “Justice 
Breyer joined in some parts of Justice Stevens’ plurality 
opinion (thus making it a majority opinion at times),” 
including “in Part V”). But we also read Justice Breyer’s 
concurrence as reaching the opposite conclusion, despite 
his having joined that portion of the majority opinion.  
See id.  Faced with an apparent conflict between Part V 
of the majority opinion and Justice Breyer’s concurrence, 
we followed the latter because it was narrower, just as the 
Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits had 
done.  Id. at 175–76; see also Martin v. Medtronic, 254 
F.3d 573, 581–83 (5th Cir. 2001); Kemp v. Medtronic, 
231 F.3d 216, 230 (6th Cir. 2000); Mitchell v. Collagen 
Corp., 126 F.3d 902, 911–12 (7th Cir. 1997); Papike v. 
Tambrands, Inc., 107 F.3d 737, 742 (9th Cir. 1997).  In 
doing so, we rejected our dissenting colleague’s 
argument that the narrowest-grounds approach was 
“simply inapplicable” because Justice Breyer joined Part 
V of the majority opinion and that the “correct course of 
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action” in the event of a conflict “would be to follow Part 
V as the majority opinion.”  Horn, 376 F.3d at 184 & 
n.30 (Fuentes, J., dissenting); see id. at 183 (explaining 
that the Horn majority and the Seventh and Ninth 
Circuits “also perceived a contradiction and chose to 
ignore Justice Breyer’s vote for Part V, instead crediting 
the apparently contrary reasoning in his concurrence”). 
Likewise, in United States v. Bishop, 66 F.3d 569, 
576–77 (3d Cir. 1995), we relied on the narrower 
concurring views of Justices Kennedy and O’Connor to 
limit the majority’s opinion in United States v. Lopez, 
514 U.S. 549 (1995), which they formally joined as the 
fourth and fifth votes.  We declined to read the majority 
opinion so broadly as to upend judicial deference to 
Congress’s judgment about whether an activity 
substantially implicates interstate commerce, instead 
following the concurrence’s view that the majority had 
reached a “necessary though limited holding” that still 
“counseled great restraint” before finding that Congress 
had transgressed its Commerce Clause power.  Bishop, 
66 F.3d at 590 (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 568 
(Kennedy, J., concurring)).  As in Horn, we took that 
approach notwithstanding our dissenting colleague’s 
argument that we should follow the breadth of the 
majority opinion and ignore the narrower concurrence 
because “Justices O’Connor and Kennedy joined in the 
[majority] opinion.”  Id. at 591 (Becker, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part).  As even our dissenting 
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colleague explained, we followed the narrower views of 
Justices O’Connor and Kennedy because they “form[ed] 
an intermediate bloc [of the majority] which would view 
Lopez as case-specific.”  Id.  And Horn and Bishop are 
not the only examples.  See, e.g., United States v. 
Monclavo-Cruz, 662 F.2d 1285, 1288 (9th Cir. 1981) 
(relying on the narrowing construction given to the 
majority opinion by Justice Powell, who was also a 
necessary member of the majority, to limit the majority’s 
holding in South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 
(1976)); United States v. Wilson, 636 F.2d 1161, 1164 
(8th Cir. 1980) (similar). 
To be sure, the Supreme Court once said—in a 
case not involving a linchpin concurrence—that federal 
courts should not give “much precedential weight” to a 
concurring opinion, even if it coheres with the majority 
opinion.  Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 285 n.5 
(2001); see also Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 622 
n.4 (1986) (describing the Marks rule as “inapplicable” to 
an opinion “to which five Justices expressly 
subscribed”).  Yet we have already decided that this 
principle from Alexander is inapplicable to a concurrence 
that (1) “cast the so-called ‘swing vote,’ which was 
crucial to the outcome of the case and without which 
there could be no majority,” and (2) took a narrower 
approach than the majority opinion.  Horn, 376 F.3d at 
174–75 (distinguishing Alexander on this basis). 
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Which brings us back to Justice Alito’s 
concurrence in Morse.  The linchpin justices in Morse—
Justices Alito and Kennedy—expressly conditioned their 
joining the majority opinion on a narrower interpretation 
of the opinion—namely, that it did not permit the 
restriction of speech that could plausibly be interpreted as 
political or social speech.  Had they known that lower 
courts would ignore their narrower understanding of the 
majority opinion—or had the majority opinion expressly 
gone farther than their limitations—then, by their own 
admission, they would not have joined the majority 
opinion.  That would have transformed the five-justice 
majority opinion into a three-justice plurality opinion, 
with their concurring views becoming the controlling 
narrowest grounds under an uncontroversial application 
of the Marks doctrine.  Why, then, should it matter 
whether they formally joined the majority opinion or not? 
It should not.  Ignoring limitations placed on the 
majority opinion by a necessary member of the majority 
would mean that four justices could “fabricate a majority 
by binding a fifth to their interpretation of what they say, 
even though he writes separately to explain his own more 
narrow understanding.”  McKoy, 494 U.S. at 462 n.3 
(Scalia, J., dissenting).  That produces inexplicable 
anomalies.  If a four-justice plurality holds X and Y, and 
a fifth justice “concurs in the judgment” to hold only X 
and rejects Y, the fifth member’s more limited views 
become binding under a straightforward application of 
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Marks.  The same interpretation is true if the fifth justice 
joins the majority opinion and “concurs in part.”  Yet if 
the same concurring justice joins the majority opinion 
while “concurring,” then the majority opinion holding X 
and Y becomes binding and the fifth member’s narrower 
views evaporate.  Such an approach places all of its 
weight on the distinction between a justice’s choice to 
follow his name with “concurring” instead of “concurring 
in part” or “concurring in the judgment.”  Cf. West, 
Concurring in Part and Concurring in the Confusion, 
104 Mich. L. Rev. at 1953–54 (explaining why these 
“after the comma” phrases cannot bear such weight); 
Tristan C. Pelham-Webb, Note, Powelling for Precedent: 
“Binding” Concurrences, 64 N.Y.U. Ann. Surv. Am. L. 
693, 737 (2009) (same).  That elevates formalism over 
substance at the expense of ignoring the very conditions 
on which a necessary member of the majority expressly 
chose to join the majority. 
In short, because Justice Alito’s concurrence 
provides “a single legal standard . . . [that] when properly 
applied, produce[s] results with which a majority of the 
Justices in the case articulating the standard would 
agree,” United States v. Donovan, 661 F.3d 174, 182 (3d 
Cir. 2011) (alterations in original) (internal quotation 
marks and citations omitted), his opinion in Morse forms 
the “narrowest grounds necessary to secure a majority,” 
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 947 F.2d 682, 
694 n.7 (3d Cir. 1991), aff’d in part and rev’d in part on 
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other grounds, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).  As a result, we 
agree with the en banc Fifth Circuit that the limitations 
placed on the majority opinion by Justice Alito’s 
concurrence are binding on us.
17
  See Morgan v. 
Swanson, 659 F.3d 359, 403 (5th Cir. 2011) (en banc) 
(majority opinion of Elrod, J.) (describing Justice Alito’s 
Morse concurrence as “controlling”); see also Morgan v. 
Plano Indep. Sch. Dist., 589 F.3d 740, 746 n.25 (5th Cir. 
2009) (“We have held Justice Alito’s concurrence to be 
the controlling opinion in Morse.” (citing Ponce, 508 
F.3d at 768)). 
                                              
17
 We have had this same intuition previously.  See J.S., 
650 F.3d at 927 (“Notably, Justice Alito’s concurrence in 
Morse further emphasizes the narrowness of the Court’s 
holding.”).  And every court of appeals to address this 
question (other than the Seventh Circuit) has shared our 
intuition.  See Morgan, 589 F.3d at 746 n.25; Barr v. 
Lafon, 538 F.3d 554, 564 (6th Cir. 2008) (treating Justice 
Alito’s concurrence as the basis for Morse’s “narrow 
holding”); Corder v. Lewis Palmer Sch. Dist. No. 38, 566 
F.3d 1219, 1228 (10th Cir. 2009) (same).  The Seventh 
Circuit concluded, without citation or support, that the 
narrowest-grounds approachdoes not apply where there is 
a majority opinion, as in Morse.Nuxoll ex rel. Nuxoll v. 
Indian Prairie Sch. Dist. No. 204, 523 F.3d 668, 673 (7th 
Cir. 2008).  But as we explain, we have already rejected 
the Seventh Circuit’s formalist approach when it was 
urged by dissenting colleagues in Horn and Bishop.    
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Justice Alito would have protected political or 
social speech reasonably interpreted to advocate illegal 
drug use, and that protection applies even more strongly 
to ambiguously lewd speech.  In Morse, the Court added 
a new categorical exception to Tinker: student speech 
that a reasonable observer could interpret as advocating 
illegal drug use but that cannot plausibly be interpreted as 
addressing political or social issues.  Id. at 422.  The 
exception was justified because illegal drugs pose an 
“immediately obvious,” “grave” and “unique threat to the 
physical safety of students.”  Id. at 425.  Despite that 
threat, however, the Court held that speech advocating 
illegal drug use is not categorically unprotected if it “can 
plausibly be interpreted as commenting on any political 
or social issue, including speech on issues such as the 
wisdom of the war on drugs or of legalizing marijuana 
for medicinal use.”  Id. at 422 (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  Even with that limitation, the Court made clear 
that this new exception to Tinker “stand[s] at the far 
reaches of what the First Amendment permits.”  Id. at 
425. 
If speech posing such a “grave” and “unique threat 
to the physical safety of students” can be categorically 
regulated only when it cannot “plausibly be interpreted as 
commenting on any political or social issue”—and that 
regulation nonetheless “stand[s] at the far reaches of 
what the First Amendment permits”—then there is no 
reason why ambiguously lewd speech should receive any 
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less protection when it also “can plausibly be interpreted 
as commenting on any political or social issue.”  Id. at 
422, 425.  One need not be a philosopher of Mill or 
Feinberg’s stature18 to recognize that harmful speech 
posing an “immediately obvious” threat to the “physical 
safety of students,” id. at 425, presents a far graver threat 
to the educational mission of schools—thereby 
warranting less protection—than ambiguously lewd 
speech that might undercut teaching “the appropriate 
form of civil discourse” to students, Fraser, 478 U.S. at 
683.  It would make no sense to afford a T-shirt 
exclaiming “I ♥ pot! (LEGALIZE IT)” protection under 
Morse while declaring that a bracelet saying “I ♥ 
boobies! (KEEP A BREAST)” is unprotected under 
Fraser.   
Those limits are persuasive on their own terms, 
even if we disregard the controlling limitations of Justice 
Alito’s Morse concurrence.  Fraser reflects the 
longstanding notions that “not all speech is of equal First 
                                              
18
 John Stuart Mill and Joel Feinberg are both known for, 
among other things, their groundbreaking work on the 
relationship between harm and offense and how conduct 
of each type might be subject to criminalization.  See 
generally Joel Feinberg, Harm to Others: The Moral 
Limits of the Criminal Law (1984); Joel Feinberg, 
Offense to Others: The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law 
(1985); John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (1859). 
48 
 
Amendment importance” and that “speech on matters of 
public concern . . . is at the heart of the First 
Amendment’s protection.”  Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 
1207, 1215 (2011) (quotation marks and citations 
omitted); see also Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 145 
(1983) (“[S]peech on public issues occupies the highest 
rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values, and is 
entitled to special protection.” (internal quotation marks 
and citations omitted)).  And it is only a limited 
exception to the otherwise “bedrock principle” of the 
First Amendment that “the government may not prohibit 
the expression of an idea simply because society finds the 
idea itself offensive or disagreeable.”  Texas v. Johnson, 
491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989); see also Sable Commc’ns of 
Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989) (“Sexual 
expression which is indecent but not obscene is protected 
by the First Amendment.”).  The Supreme Court has 
never held that schools may bore willy-nilly through that 
bedrock principle.  But it has made clear that “minors are 
entitled to a significant measure of First Amendment 
protection” and the government does not “have a free-
floating power to restrict the ideas to which children may 
be exposed.”  Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 
2729, 2736 (2011).  To be sure, Fraser rejected the idea 
that “simply because an offensive form of expression 
may not be prohibited to adults making what the speaker 
considers a political point, the same latitude must be 
permitted to children in a public school.”  Fraser, 478 
U.S. at 682.  As we have explained, though, Fraser was 
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limited to plainly lewd speech, and that refusal to protect 
a student’s plainly lewd speech where the same speech 
by an adult would be protected does not extend to 
political speech that is not plainly lewd.  On that score, 
our conclusion puts us in good company with five 
justices in Morse
19
 who were expressly unwilling to 
permit a categorical exception to Tinker that would 
intrude on political or social speech and two justices
20
 
                                              
19
 In addition to Justices Alito and Kennedy, three 
dissenting justices (Justices Stevens, Souter, and 
Ginsburg) would not have extended the Morse exception 
to political or social speech.  These five justices instead 
split over whether Morse’s speech could reasonably be 
interpreted as advocating illegal drug use.  Morse, 551 
U.S. at 444, 448 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (concluding that 
Morse’s banner is constitutionally protected because it 
could not reasonably be interpreted as advocating illegal 
drug use and was at most a “minority[] viewpoint” in 
“the national debate about a serious issue” deserving 
First Amendment protection). 
20
 In the majority opinion, Chief Justice Roberts and 
Justice Scalia refused to “stretch[] Fraser” so far as to 
“encompass any speech that could fit under some 
definition of ‘offensive’” specifically to protect “political 
and religious speech [that] might be perceived as 
offensive to some.”  Morse, 551 U.S. at 409; see also id. 
at 403 (majority opinion) (“But not even Frederick 
argues that the banner conveys any sort of political or 
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who all but said as much.   
What’s more, this limitation is consistent with our 
previous intuitions as well as those of the Sixth and 
Second Circuits.  See Saxe, 240 F.3d at 213 (Alito, J.) 
(noting that the “dichotomy” between Fraser and Tinker 
is “neatly illustrated by the comparison between Cohen’s 
[“Fuck the Draft”] jacket and Tinker’s armband”); Defoe, 
625 F.3d at 335 n.6 (rejecting the Eleventh Circuit’s 
extension of Fraser to displays of the Confederate flag 
and instead holding that such displays “by students [are] 
protected political speech that school officials may only 
regulate by satisfying the Tinker standard” (citing Barr v. 
Lefon, 538 F.3d. 554, 569 n.7 (6th Cir. 2008))); Guiles, 
                                                                                                     
religious message.  Contrary to the dissent’s suggestion, 
this is plainly not a case about political debate over the 
criminalization of drug use or possession.”); id. at 406 
n.2 (“[T]here is no serious argument that Frederick’s 
banner is political speech . . . .”).  Although Justice 
Thomas joined that portion of the majority opinion, he 
would have concluded that “the First Amendment, as 
originally understood, does not protect student speech in 
public schools” and overruled Tinker.  Id. at 410–11 
(Thomas, J., concurring).  Justice Breyer would have 
avoided the “difficult First Amendment issue” and 
concluded that “qualified immunity bars [Morse’s] claim 
for monetary damages.”  Id. at 425 (Breyer, J., 
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). 
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461 F.3d at 325 (holding Fraser inapplicable because the 
T-shirt was not “as plainly offensive as the sexually 
charged speech considered in Fraser . . . [,] especially 
when considering that [it was] part of an anti-drug 
political message”). 
Consequently, we hold that the Fraser exception 
does not permit ambiguously lewd speech to be 
categorically restricted if it can plausibly be interpreted 
as political or social speech.  
3. Under Fraser, schools may restrict plainly 
lewd speech regardless of whether it could 
plausibly be interpreted as social or political 
commentary. 
As the Supreme Court made clear in Fraser, 
though, schools may restrict plainly lewd speech 
regardless of whether it could plausibly be interpreted to 
comment on a political or social issue.  Fraser, 478 U.S. 
at 682 (“[T]he First Amendment gives a high school 
student the classroom right to wear Tinker’s armband, 
but not Cohen’s [“Fuck the Draft”] jacket.”).  That is true 
by definition.  Plainly lewd speech “offends for the same 
reasons obscenity offends” because the speech in that 
category is “no essential part of any exposition of ideas” 
and thus carries very “slight social value.”  Id. at 683 
(quoting Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. at 746 (plurality 
opinion)).  As with obscenity in general, obscenity to 
minors, and all other historically unprotected categories 
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of speech, “the evil to be restricted so overwhelmingly 
outweighs the expressive interests, if any, at stake, that 
no process of case-by-case adjudication is required” 
because “the balance of competing interests is clearly 
struck.”  Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1585–86 (quoting New 
York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 763–64 (1982)).  In other 
words, we do not engage in a case-by-case determination 
of whether obscenity to minors—and by extension, 
plainly lewd speech under Fraser—carries social value.  
As a result, schools may continue to regulate plainly 
lewd, vulgar, profane, or offensive speech under Fraser 
even if a particular instance of such speech can 
“plausibly be interpreted as commenting on any political 
or social issue.”  Morse, 551 U.S. at 422 (Alito, J., 
concurring). 
In response, the School District recites a mantra 
that has Fraser providing schools the ultimate discretion 
to define what is lewd and vulgar.  It relies on the 
Supreme Court’s sentiment that schools may define their 
“basic educational mission” and prohibit student speech 
that is inconsistent with that mission.  Kuhlmeier, 484 
U.S. at 266–67.21  Indeed, before Morse, some courts of 
                                              
21
 See also Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683 (“[T]he determination 
of what manner of speech in the classroom or in school 
assembly is inappropriate properly rests with the school 
board.”); Pico, 457 U.S. at 864 (“[F]ederal courts should 
not ordinarily ‘intervene in the resolution of conflicts 
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appeals adopted that broad interpretation of the Supreme 
Court’s student-speech cases.  See, e.g., LaVine v. Blaine 
Sch. Dist., 257 F.3d 981, 988 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[A] 
school need not tolerate student speech that is 
inconsistent with its basic educational mission.”); Boroff 
v. Van Wert City Bd. of Educ., 220 F.3d 465, 470 (6th 
Cir. 2000) (“[W]here Boroff’s T-shirts contain symbols 
and words that promote values that are so patently 
contrary to the school’s educational mission, the School 
has the authority, under the circumstances of this case, to 
prohibit those T-shirts [under Fraser].”). 
Whatever the face value of those sentiments, such 
sweeping and total deference to school officials is 
incompatible with the Supreme Court’s teachings.  In 
Tinker, Hazelwood, and Morse, the Supreme Court 
independently evaluated the meaning of the student’s 
speech and the reasonableness of the school’s 
                                                                                                     
which arise in the daily operation of school systems.’” 
(quoting Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 
(1968))); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 326 (1975) 
(“It is not the role of the federal courts to set aside 
decisions of school administrators which the court may 
view as lacking a basis in wisdom or compassion.”); see 
also Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 273 (“[T]he education of the 
Nation’s youth is primarily the responsibility of parents, 
teachers, and state and local school officials, and not of 
federal judges.”).   
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interpretation and actions.  There is no reason the 
school’s authority under Fraser should receive special 
treatment.  More importantly, such an approach would 
swallow the other student-speech cases, including Tinker, 
effectively eliminating judicial review of student-speech 
restrictions.  See Guiles, 461 F.3d at 327 (making this 
point).  That is precisely why the Supreme Court in 
Morse explicitly rejected total deference to school 
officials: 
The opinion of the Court does not endorse the 
broad argument advanced by petitioners and 
the United States that the First Amendment 
permits public school officials to censor any 
student speech that interferes with a school's 
“educational mission.” . . . The “educational 
mission” argument would give public school 
authorities a license to suppress speech on 
political and social issues based on 
disagreement with the viewpoint expressed. 
The argument, therefore, strikes at the very 
heart of the First Amendment. 
Morse, 551 U.S. at 423 (Alito, J., concurring).   
Instead, Morse settled on a narrower view of 
deference, deferring to a school administrator’s 
“reasonable judgment that Frederick’s sign qualified as 
drug advocacy” only if the speech could not plausibly be 
interpreted as commenting on a political or social issue.  
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Morse, 551 U.S. at 441 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also 
id. at 408 (majority opinion) (“[S]chools [may] restrict 
student expression that they reasonably regard as 
promoting illegal drug use.”); id. at 422 (Alito, J., 
concurring) (“[A] public school may restrict speech that a 
reasonable observer would interpret as advocating illegal 
drug use . . . .”).  Our approach to lewd speech provides 
the same degree of deference to schools as the Court did 
in Morse.  We defer to a school’s reasonable judgment 
that an observer could interpret ambiguous speech as 
lewd, vulgar, profane, or offensive only if the speech 
could not plausibly be interpreted as commenting on a 
political or social issue. 
The School District invokes a parade of horribles 
that, in its view, would follow from our framework: 
protecting ambiguously lewd speech that comments on 
political or social issues—like the bracelets in this case—
will encourage students to engage in more egregiously 
sexualized advocacy campaigns, which the schools will 
be obliged to allow.  See Pa. Sch. Bd. Ass’n Amicus Br. 
in Supp. of Appellant at 19 (listing examples, including 
“I ♥ Balls!” apparel for testicular cancer, and “I ♥ Va Jay 
Jays” apparel for the Human Papillomaviruses); App. 
275–76 (raising the possibility of apparel bearing the 
slogans “I ♥ Balls!” or “I ♥ Titties!”).  Like all slippery-
slope arguments, the School District’s point can be 
inverted with equal logical force.  If schools can 
categorically regulate terms like “boobies” even when the 
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message comments on a social or political issue, schools 
could eliminate all student speech touching on sex or 
merely having the potential to offend.  See Frederick 
Schauer, Slippery Slopes, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 361, 381 
(1985) (“[I]n virtually every case in which a slippery 
slope argument is made, the opposing party could with 
equal formal and linguistic logic also make a slippery 
slope claim.”).  The ease of turning a slippery-slope 
argument on its head explains why the persuasiveness of 
such a contention does not depend on its logical validity.  
Id.  Instead, the correctness of a slippery-slope argument 
depends on an empirical prediction that a proposed rule 
will increase the likelihood of some other undesired 
outcome occurring.  Id. (“To some people, one argument 
will seem more persuasive than the other because the 
underlying empirical reality . . . makes one equally 
logical possibility seem substantially more likely to occur 
than the other.”); see also Eugene Volokh, The 
Mechanism of the Slippery Slope, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 
1026, 1066–71 (2003) (making a similar point in the 
context of extending precedent).  Because courts usually 
lack the data necessary for such a prediction, “fear of . . . 
what’s at the bottom of a long, slippery slope is not a 
good reason for today’s decision.”  Marozsan v. United 
States, 852 F.2d 1469, 1499 (7th Cir. 1988) (en banc) 
(Easterbrook, J., dissenting).  “The terror of extreme 
hypotheticals produces much bad law,” and so our 
answer to the School District’s “extreme hypothetical[s]” 
is that we will “cross that bridge when we come to it.”  
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Id. 
To make matters worse, the School District has 
greased the supposedly slippery slope by omitting any 
empirical evidence.  We have no reason to think either 
that the parents of middle-school students will be willing 
to allow their children to wear apparel advocating 
political or social messages in egregious terms or that a 
student will overcome the typical middle-schooler’s 
embarrassment, immaturity, and social pressures by 
wearing such apparel.  And many of the School District’s 
hypotheticals pose no worries under our framework.  A 
school could categorically restrict an “I ♥ tits! (KEEP A 
BREAST)” bracelet because, as the Supreme Court 
explained in Pacifica, the word “tits” (and also 
presumably the diminutive “titties”) is a patently 
offensive reference to sexual organs and thus obscene to 
minors.  See Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. at 745–46 
(plurality opinion) (explaining that the comedian George 
Carlin’s seven “dirty” words, which includes “tits,” 
“offend for the same reasons that obscenity offends”); 
see also LaVine, 257 F.3d at 989 (concluding that a poem 
“filled with imagery of violent death and suicide” was 
not “vulgar, lewd, obscene, or plainly offensive because 
it was “not ‘an elaborate, graphic, and explicit sexual 
metaphor’ as was the student’s speech in Fraser, nor 
[did] it contain the infamous seven words that cannot be 
said on the public airwaves”); cf. FCC v. Fox Television 
Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 517–18 (2009) (concluding 
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it was not arbitrary or capricious for the FCC to regulate 
even “isolated uses of sexual and excretory words,” 
including Carlin’s seven “dirty” words, because “[e]ven 
isolated utterances can be made in pander[ing], . . . 
vulgar and shocking manners” and can thus “constitute 
harmful first blow[s] to children” (alterations in 
original)).  The same is true of a student’s drawings of 
stick figures in sexual positions, even if used to promote 
contraceptive use.  Cf. R.O. ex rel. Ochshorn City Sch. 
Dist., 645 F.3d 533, 543 (2d Cir. 2011).  And even if 
students engage in more questionable speech, the school 
retains the government’s normal sovereign authority to 
regulate speech as well as its additional powers as 
educator to restrict speech under Tinker, Kuhlmeier, and 
Morse.  See, e.g., Hardwick v. Heyward, 711 F.3d 426, 
440 (4th Cir. 2013) (holding that a school’s prohibition 
on wearing T-shirts depicting the Confederate battle flag 
was permissible under Tinker because of a history of 
racial tension and disruptions related to the Confederate 
flag).  
By contrast, there is empirical support for the 
opposite worry.  Some schools, if empowered to do so, 
might eliminate all student speech touching on sex or 
merely having the potential to offend.  Indeed, the 
Middle School’s administrators seemed inclined to do 
just that.  They initially testified that they could ban the 
word “breast,” even if used in the context of a breast-
cancer-awareness campaign, because the word, by itself, 
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“can be construed as [having] a sexual connotation.”  
App. 490, 497.  If anything, the fear of a slippery slope 
cuts against the School District. 
In a similar vein, we need not speculate on 
context-dependent hypotheticals to give guidance to 
schools and district courts.  The fault lines of our 
framework are adequately mapped out in the rest of First 
Amendment jurisprudence.  The Supreme Court’s 
obscenity-to-minors case law marks the contours of 
plainly lewd speech.  See, e.g., Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. 
Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2735 (refusing to extend the 
categorical nonprotection for obscenity to minors to 
speech that is violent from a minor’s perspective); 
Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 638 (approving a state prohibition 
on selling minors sexual material that would be obscene 
from the minor’s perspective).  Those contours 
necessarily admit of some flexibility and can be 
“adjust[ed] . . . ‘to social realities by permitting the 
[sexual] appeal of this type of material to be assessed” 
from the minors’ perspective.  Id.; see also Fox 
Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. at 520 (explaining that 
based on the obscenity-to-minors case law, the FCC 
properly “dr[aws] distinctions between the offensiveness 
of particular words based upon the context in which they 
appeared” on case-by-case basis without having to rely 
on empirical evidence as to the degree of offensiveness).  
And the government is not a stranger to determining 
whether speech plausibly comments on a political or 
60 
 
social issue.  For that, we look to case law on whether 
speech involves a matter of public concern.  See, e.g., 
Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418 (2006) 
(“Pickering and the cases decided in its wake identify 
two inquiries to guide interpretation of the constitutional 
protections accorded to public employee speech.  The 
first requires determining whether the employee spoke as 
a citizen on a matter of public concern. . . .  If the answer 
is yes, then the possibility of a First Amendment claim 
arises.”).  Of course, these rules lack “perfect clarity”—
just as every legal rule contains fuzzy borders.  Brown, 
131 S. Ct. at 2764 (Breyer, J., dissenting); cf. United 
States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 304 (2008) (“[P]erfect 
clarity and precise guidance have never been required 
even of regulations that restrict expressive activity.”).  
Even so, just because a “precise standard” for political 
speech or plain lewdness (obscenity to minors) “proves 
elusive,” it is still “easy enough to identify instances that 
fall within a legitimate regulation.”  Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 
2764 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  Over time, the fault lines 
demarcating plainly lewd speech and political or social 
speech will settle and become more rule-like as precedent 
accumulates. 
To recap: Under the government’s sovereign 
authority, a school may categorically ban obscenity, 
fighting words, and the like in schools; the student-
speech cases do not supplant the government’s sovereign 
powers to regulate speech.  See, e.g., Doe v. Pulaski 
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Cnty. Special Sch. Dist., 306 F.3d 616, 626, 626–27 (8th 
Cir. 2002) (en banc) (holding that the government, as K-
12 educator, could punish a student for making a true 
threat); Cuff ex rel. B.C. v. Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 677 
F.3d 109, 118 (2d Cir. 2012) (Pooler, J., dissenting) 
(“Indeed, despite the expansion of school-specific 
exceptions to the First Amendment’s general prohibition 
against government restrictions on speech, certain well-
settled rules apply to adults and adolescents alike.”).  
Under Fraser, a school may categorically restrict plainly 
lewd, vulgar, or profane speech that “offends for the 
same reasons obscenity offends” regardless of whether it 
can plausibly be interpreted as commenting on social or 
political issues.  Saxe, 240 F.3d at 213 (quoting Fraser, 
478 U.S. at 685).  As we have explained, see supra at 
20–21, plainly lewd speech cannot, by definition, be 
plausibly interpreted as political or social commentary 
because the speech offends for the same reason obscenity 
offends and thus has slight social value.  Fraser also 
permits a school to categorically restrict ambiguous 
speech that a reasonable observer could interpret as 
having a lewd, vulgar, or profane meaning so long as it 
could not also plausibly be interpreted as commenting on 
a social or political issue.  But Fraser does not permit a 
school to categorically restrict ambiguous speech that a 
reasonable observer could interpret as having a lewd, 
vulgar, or profane meaning and could plausibly interpret 
as commenting on a social or political issue.  And of 
course, if a reasonable observer could not interpret the 
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speech as lewd, vulgar, or profane, then Fraser simply 
does not apply.  As always, a school’s other powers over 
student speech under Tinker, Kuhlmeier, and Morse 
remain as a backstop. 
C. The Middle School’s ban on “I ♥ boobies! 
(KEEP A BREAST)” bracelets 
 Under this framework, the School District’s 
bracelet ban is an open-and-shut case.  The “I ♥ boobies! 
(KEEP A BREAST)” bracelets are not plainly lewd.  The 
slogan bears no resemblance to Fraser’s “pervasive 
sexual innuendo” that was “plainly offensive to both 
teachers and students.”  Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683.  
Teachers had to request guidance about how to deal with 
the bracelets, and school administrators did not conclude 
that the bracelets were vulgar until B.H. and K.M. had 
worn them every day for nearly two months.  In addition, 
the Middle School used the term “boobies” in 
announcing the bracelet ban over the public address 
system and the school television station.  What’s more, 
the bracelets do not contain language remotely akin to the 
seven words that are considered obscene to minors on 
broadcast television.  Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. at 745–
46 (plurality opinion); LaVine, 257 F.3d at 989 
(concluding that speech was not vulgar, lewd, obscene, or 
plainly offensive because it was “not ‘an elaborate, 
graphic, and explicit sexual metaphor’ as was the 
student’s speech in Fraser, nor [did] it contain the 
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infamous seven words that cannot be said on the public 
airwaves” under Pacifica).  Indeed, the term “boobie” is 
no more than a sophomoric synonym for “breast.”  And 
as the School District also concedes, a reasonable 
observer would plausibly interpret the bracelets as part of 
a national breast-cancer-awareness campaign, an 
undeniably important social issue.  Oral Arg. Tr. at 
10:11–16; see also K.J. ex rel. Braun v. Sauk Prairie Sch. 
Dist., No. 11-CV-622, slip op. at 14 (W.D. Wis. Feb. 6, 
2012) (“When one reads the entire phrase, it is clearly a 
message designed to promote breast cancer awareness.”).  
Accordingly, the bracelets cannot be categorically 
banned under Fraser.
22
 
IV. 
 Fraser, of course, is only one of four school-
specific avenues for regulating student speech.
23
  The 
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 Because we conclude that the slogan is not plainly 
lewd and is plausibly interpreted as commenting on a 
social issue, the bracelets are protected under Fraser.  As 
a result, we need not determine whether a reasonable 
observer could interpret the bracelets’ slogan as lewd. 
23
 As the Supreme Court has recently reaffirmed, there 
might be other exceptions to Tinker that have not yet 
been identified by the courts.  See Morse, 551 U.S. at 
408–09 (identifying a new exception to the Tinker 
framework for speech that is reasonably interpreted as 
advocating illegal drug use and that is not plausibly 
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parties rightly agree that Kuhlmeier and Morse do not 
apply: no one could reasonably believe that the Middle 
School was somehow involved in the morning fashion 
decisions of a few students, and no one could reasonably 
interpret the bracelets as advocating illegal drug use. 
That leaves only Tinker as possible support for the 
School District’s ban.  Under Tinker’s “general rule,” the 
government may restrict school speech “that threatens a 
specific and substantial disruption to the school 
environment” or “inva[des] . . . the rights of others.”  
Saxe, 240 F.3d at 211 (citing Tinker, 393 U.S. at 504).  
“[I]f a school can point to a well-founded expectation of 
disruption—especially one based on past incidents 
arising out of similar speech—the restriction may pass 
                                                                                                     
interpreted as commenting on any political or social 
issue).  Compare id. at 405 (“Fraser established that the 
mode of analysis set forth in Tinker is not absolute.”), 
and id. at 406 (“And, like Fraser, [Kuhlmeier] confirms 
that the rule of Tinker is not the only basis for restricting 
student speech.”), with id. at 423 (Alito, J., concurring) 
(“I join the opinion of the Court on the understanding 
that the opinion does not hold that the special 
characteristics of the public schools necessarily justify 
any other speech restrictions.” (emphasis added)).  Here, 
however, the School District relies solely on the existing 
school-speech framework and does not propose any new 
bases for restricting student speech. 
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constitutional muster.”  Id. at 212; J.S. v. Blue Mountain 
Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 928 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc) 
(“[T]he School District need not prove with absolute 
certainty that substantial disruption will occur.”).  The 
School District has the burden of showing that the 
bracelet ban is constitutional under Tinker.  See J.S., 650 
F.3d at 928.  That it cannot do. 
Tinker meant what it said: “a specific and 
significant fear of disruption, not just some remote 
apprehension of disturbance.”  Id.  Tinker’s black 
armbands did not meet this standard, even though the 
armbands “caused comments, warnings by other 
students, the poking of fun at them, . . . a warning by an 
older football player that other, nonprotesting students 
had better let them alone,” and the “wreck[ing]” of a 
math teacher’s lesson period.  Tinker, 393 U.S. at 517 
(Black, J., dissenting). 
Here, the record of disruption is even skimpier.  
When the School District announced the bracelet ban, it 
had no more than an “undifferentiated fear or remote 
apprehension of disturbance.”  Sypniewski, 307 F.3d at 
257.  The bracelets had been on campus for at least two 
weeks without incident.  B.H., 827 F. Supp. 2d at 408; 
see also App. 13 (“[N]one of the three principals had 
heard any reports of disruption or student misbehavior 
linked to the bracelets.  Nor had any of the principals 
heard reports of inappropriate comments about 
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‘boobies.’”).  That track record “speaks strongly against a 
finding of likelihood of disruption.”  Sypniewski, 307 
F.3d at 254. 
The School District instead relies on two incidents 
that occurred after the ban.  In one, a female student told 
a teacher that she believed some boys had remarked to 
girls about their “boobies” in relation to the bracelets—
an incident that was never confirmed.  B.H., 827 F. Supp. 
2d at 408.  In the other, two female students were 
discussing the bracelets during lunch, and a boy 
interrupted them to say “I want boobies” while “making 
inappropriate gestures with two spherical candies.”  Id.  
The boy was suspended for a day.  Id.   
Even assuming that disruption arising after a 
school’s speech restriction could satisfy Tinker—a 
question we need not decide today—these two isolated 
incidents hardly bespeak a substantial disruption caused 
by the bracelets.  “[S]tudent expression may not be 
suppressed simply because it gives rise to some slight, 
easily overlooked disruption, including but not limited to 
‘a showing of mild curiosity’ by other students, 
‘discussion and comment’ among students, or even some 
‘hostile remarks’ or ‘discussion outside of the 
classrooms’ by other students.”  Holloman ex rel. 
Holloman v. Harland, 370 F.3d 1252, 1271–72 (11th Cir. 
2004) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).  
Given that Tinker’s black armband—worn to protest a 
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controversial war and divisive enough to prompt 
reactions from other students—was not a substantial 
disruption, neither is the “silent, passive expression” of 
breast-cancer awareness.
24
  Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508.  If 
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 According to B.H. and K.M., Tinker’s substantial-
disruption standard does not permit a school to restrict 
speech because of the heckler’s veto of other students’ 
disruptive reactions.  See Appellees’ Br. at 35 (emphasis 
added).  Because no forecast of substantial disruption 
would be reasonable on this record under any meaning of 
that term, we need not determine the precise interplay 
between the anti-heckler’s veto principle present 
elsewhere in free-speech doctrine and Tinker’s 
substantial-disruption standard in public schools.  
Compare Zamecnik, 636 F.3d at 879 (noting that Tinker 
endorsed both the heckler’s veto doctrine and the 
substantial-disruption test and concluding that other 
students’ harassment of “Zamecnik because of their 
disapproval of her [“Be Happy, Not Gay” T-shirt] is not a 
permissible ground for banning it”), and Holloman, 370 
F.3d at 1275–76 (interpreting Tinker as endorsing an 
anti-heckler’s veto principle, concluding that “[w]hile the 
same constitutional standards do not always apply in 
public schools as on public streets, we cannot afford 
students less constitutional protection simply because 
their peers might illegally express disagreement through 
violence instead of reason”), with Taylor v. Roswell 
Indep. Sch. Dist., 713 F.3d 25, 38 (10th Cir. Apr. 8, 
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anything, the fact that these incidents did not occur until 
after the School District banned the bracelets suggests 
that the ban “exacerbated rather than contained the 
disruption in the school.”  J.S., 650 F.3d at 931 (drawing 
this same conclusion on a similar record). 
  Undeterred, the School District invokes the other 
half of Tinker’s general rule, arguing that the bracelets 
invade other students’ Title IX rights to be free from 
sexual harassment.  See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513.  Under 
Title IX, students may sue federally-funded schools that 
“act[] with deliberate indifference” to “harassment that is 
so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive . . . that 
the victim students are effectively denied equal access to 
an institution’s resources and opportunities.”  Saxe, 240 
F.3d at 205–06 (quoting Davis ex rel. LaShonda D. v. 
Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 516 U.S. 629, 651 (1999)).  
According to the School District, the “I ♥ boobies! 
(KEEP A BREAST)” bracelet was “deemed 
inappropriate for school due to the likelihood of a 
resultant increase in student-on-student sexual 
harassment.”  Sch. Dist.’s Br. at 54. 
                                                                                                     
2013) (“Plaintiffs note that most disruptions occurred 
only because of wrongful behavior of third parties and 
that no Plaintiffs participated in these activities. . . . This 
argument might be effective outside the school context, 
but it ignores the ‘special characteristics of the school 
environment.’” (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506)). 
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 That argument suffers from several flaws, not the 
least of which is the School District’s failure to raise it in 
the District Court and that Court’s consequent failure to 
address it.  Freeman v. Pittsburgh Glass Works, LLC, 
709 F.3d 240, 249 (3d Cir. 2013) (“We generally refuse 
to consider issues that the parties have not raised below.” 
(citing Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 120 (1976))).  
But there is an even more basic reason why the School 
District’s invocation of Title IX is not the shield it claims 
to be.  Even assuming that protecting students from 
harassment under Title IX would satisfy Tinker’s rights-
of-others prong,
25
 the School District does not explain 
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 As we have repeatedly noted, “the precise scope of 
Tinker’s ‘interference with the rights of others’ language 
is unclear.”  Saxe, 240 F.3d at 217 (quoting Tinker, 393 
U.S. at 504); DeJohn v. Temple Univ., 537 F.3d 301, 319 
(3d Cir. 2008).  And the Supreme Court has “never 
squarely addressed whether harassment, when it takes the 
form of pure speech, is exempt from First Amendment 
protection.”  Saxe, 240 F.3d at 207.  We need not address 
either of these points today.  Even if Tinker permits 
school regulation of pure speech that would constitute 
“harassment” under Title IX, the School District has not 
offered any explanation or evidence of how passively 
wearing the “I ♥ boobies! (KEEP A BREAST)” bracelets 
would create such a severe and pervasive environment in 
the Middle School.  Cf. Saxe, 240 F.3d at 204 (Alito, J.) 
(“There is no categorical ‘harassment exception’ to the 
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why the bracelets would breed an environment of 
pervasive and severe harassment.  See, e.g., DeJohn v. 
Temple Univ., 537 F.3d 301, 320 (3d Cir. 2008) 
(“[U]nless harassment is qualified with a standard akin to 
a severe or pervasive requirement, [an anti-]harassment 
policy may suppress core protected speech.”); Saxe, 240 
F.3d at 217 (rejecting a school district’s similar argument 
that it could ban speech creating a “hostile environment” 
without showing that the particular speech covered by the 
policy would create a severe or pervasive environment); 
see also Nuxoll ex rel. Nuxoll v. Indian Prairie Sch. Dist. 
No. 204, 523 F.3d 668, 676 (7th Cir. 2008) (“[I]t is 
highly speculative that allowing the plaintiff to wear a T-
shirt that says “Be Happy, Not Gay” would have even a 
slight tendency to provoke such incidents [of student-on-
student harassment], or for that matter to poison the 
educational atmosphere.”). 
The bracelet ban cannot be upheld on the authority 
of Tinker. 
V. 
 Because the School District’s ban cannot pass 
scrutiny under Fraser or Tinker, B.H. and K.M. are likely 
to succeed on the merits.  In light of that conclusion, the 
                                                                                                     
First Amendment’s free speech clause.”); Rodriguez v. 
Maricopa Cnty. Cmty. College Dist., 605 F.3d 703, 708 
(9th Cir. 2010) (agreeing with Saxe’s statement). 
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remaining preliminary-injunction factors also favor them.  
The ban prevents B.H. and K.M. from exercising their 
right to freedom of speech, which “unquestionably 
constitutes irreparable injury.”  K.A. ex rel. Ayers v. 
Pocono Mountain Sch. Dist., 710 F.3d 99, 113 (3d Cir. 
2013) (quoting Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976) 
(plurality opinion)).  An after-the-fact money judgment 
would hardly make up for their lost opportunity to wear 
the bracelets in school.  See Elrod, 427 U.S. at 374 n.29 
(“The timeliness of political speech is particularly 
important.”).   
And the preliminary injunction does not “result in 
even greater harm to” the School District, the non-
moving party.  Allegheny Energy, Inc. v. DQE, Inc., 171 
F.3d 153, 158 (3d Cir. 1999).  The School District 
complains that unless the bracelet ban stands, it “has no 
clear guidance” on how to enforce its dress code.  
Appellant’s Br. at 60.  But the injunction addresses only 
the School District’s ban of the “I ♥ boobies! (KEEP A 
BREAST)” bracelets.  It does not enjoin the School 
District’s regulation of other types of apparel, such as the 
“Save the ta-tas” T-shirt or testicular-cancer-awareness 
apparel bearing the phrase “feelmyballs.org.”  Whether 
the injunction stays or goes, the School District will have 
to continue making individualized assessments of 
whether it may restrict student speech consistent with the 
First Amendment, just as school administrators have 
always had to do.  See, e.g., Castorina ex rel. Rewt v. 
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Madison Cnty. Sch. Bd., 246 F.3d 536, 543 (6th Cir. 
2001) (“The foregoing discussion of the three Supreme 
Court . . . cases demonstrates the importance of the 
factual circumstances in school speech cases . . . .”).  The 
District Court’s injunction against the bracelet ban does 
not change that. 
Lastly, granting the preliminary injunction furthers 
the public interest.  The School District argues that the 
injunction eliminates its “authority to manage its student 
population” and thus harms the public.  Appellant’s Br. at 
61.  Again, that hyperbolic protest ignores the narrow 
breadth of the injunction, which addresses only the 
constitutionality of the bracelet ban under the facts of this 
case.  More importantly, allowing a school’s 
unconstitutional speech restriction to continue 
“vindicates no public interest.”  K.A., 2013 WL 915059, 
at *11 (citation omitted).  For these reasons, the District 
Court did not abuse its discretion by enjoining the School 
District’s bracelet ban. 
* * * * * 
 School administrators “have a difficult job,” and 
we are well-aware that the job is not getting any easier.  
Morse, 551 U.S. at 409.   Besides the teaching function, 
school administrators must deal with students distracted 
by cell phones in class and poverty at home, parental 
under- and over-involvement, bullying and sexting, 
preparing students for standardized testing, and ever-
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diminishing funding.  When they are not focused on 
those issues, school administrators must inculcate 
students with “the shared values of a civilized social 
order.”  Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683; see also McCauley v. 
Univ. of the V.I., 618 F.3d 232, 243 (3d Cir. 2010) 
(quoting Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 
(1954)) (“Public elementary and high school education is 
as much about learning how to be a good citizen as it is 
about multiplication tables and United States history.”).   
We do not envy those challenges, which require 
school administrators “to make numerous difficult 
decisions about when to place restrictions on speech in 
our public schools.”  Morgan v. Swanson, 659 F.3d 359, 
420 (5th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (majority opinion of Elrod, 
J.).  And the School District in this case was not 
unreasonably concerned that permitting “I ♥ boobies! 
(KEEP A BREAST)” bracelets in this case might require 
it to permit other messages that were sexually oriented in 
nature.  But schools cannot avoid teaching our citizens-
in-training how to appropriately navigate the 
“marketplace of ideas.”  Just because letting in one idea 
might invite even more difficult judgment calls about 
other ideas cannot justify suppressing speech of genuine 
social value.  Tinker, 393 U.S. at 511 (“The classroom is 
peculiarly the ‘marketplace of ideas.’  The Nation’s 
future depends upon leaders trained through wide 
exposure to that robust exchange of ideas which 
discovers truth ‘out of a multitude of tongues,’ (rather) 
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than through any kind of authoritative selection.’” 
(quoting Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of State of 
N.Y., 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967))); see id. at 511 
(“[S]chool officials cannot suppress ‘expressions of 
feelings with which they do not wish to contend.’” 
(citation omitted)).   
We will affirm the District Court’s order granting a 
preliminary injunction. 
 
1 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge, dissenting with whom 
CHAGARES, JORDAN, GREENAWAY, JR., and 
GREENBERG, join. 
 
 Today the Court holds that twelve-year-olds have a 
constitutional right to wear in school a bracelet that says ―I ♥ 
boobies! (KEEP A BREAST).‖  Because this decision is 
inconsistent with the Supreme Court‘s First Amendment 
jurisprudence, I respectfully dissent. 
I 
My colleagues conclude that the Supreme Court‘s 
decision in Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 
675 (1986), cannot justify the Easton Area School District‘s 
bracelet ban ―because [the bracelets] comment on a social 
issue.‖  Maj. Typescript at 6.  This limitation on the ability of 
schools to regulate student speech that could reasonably be 
deemed lewd, vulgar, plainly offensive, or constituting sexual 
innuendo finds no support in Fraser or its progeny.  The 
Majority‘s ―high value speech‖ modification of Fraser is 
based on the following two premises it derives from the 
Supreme Court‘s decision in Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 
393 (2007):  first, that Justice Alito‘s concurrence in Morse is 
the ―controlling‖ opinion in that case, Maj. Typescript at 21 
n.10, 43, 45, 47; and second, that Morse ―modified‖ the 
Supreme Court‘s decision in Fraser, Maj. Typescript at 6, 
46–51.  Both premises are wrong. 
A 
I begin with the Majority‘s first premise, namely, that 
Justice Alito‘s concurrence in Morse is the ―controlling‖ 
opinion in that case, despite the fact that Chief Justice 
2 
Roberts‘s majority opinion was joined in full by four other 
Justices.  Maj. Typescript at 36–46.  This distinctly minority 
view is contrary both to the understanding of Morse 
expressed by eight of our sister Courts of Appeals and to what 
we ourselves have repeatedly articulated to be the Court‘s 
holding in Morse.  By endorsing the Fifth Circuit‘s mistaken 
understanding of Morse, the Majority applies an incorrect 
legal standard that leads to the unfortunate result the Court 
reaches today. 
 The notion that Justice Alito‘s concurrence in Morse is 
the controlling opinion flows from a misunderstanding of the 
Supreme Court‘s ―narrowest grounds‖ doctrine as established 
in Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188 (1977).  In Marks, 
the petitioners had been convicted of distributing obscene 
materials pursuant to jury instructions that were modeled on 
the definition of obscenity articulated in Miller v. California, 
413 U.S. 15 (1973).  Marks, 430 U.S. at 190.  Because the 
petitioners‘ conduct occurred before the Court had decided 
Miller, they argued that due process entitled them ―to jury 
instructions not under Miller, but under the more favorable 
[obscenity] formulation of Memoirs v. Massachusetts.‖  Id.  
That formulation was unclear, however, because the Memoirs 
Court had issued a fractured decision; no more than three of 
the six Justices who voted for the judgment endorsed any one 
of three separate opinions, each of which articulated a 
different standard for obscenity.  See Memoirs v. 
Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 414, 418 (1966) (plurality 
opinion) (Justice Brennan, joined by Chief Justice Warren 
and Justice Fortas, stating that obscenity may be proscribed if 
it is ―utterly without redeeming social value‖); id. at 421, 424 
(Black and Douglas, JJ., concurring in judgment) (concurring 
separately on the grounds that obscenity cannot be 
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proscribed); id. at 421 (Stewart, J., concurring in judgment) 
(concurring on the grounds that only hard-core pornography 
is proscribable as obscene).  The lack of a majority opinion in 
Memoirs led the Sixth Circuit in Marks to reject the 
petitioners‘ argument that the plurality‘s ―utterly without 
redeeming social value‖ standard was the governing rule.   It 
reasoned that because ―the Memoirs standards never 
commanded the assent of more than three Justices at any one 
time . . . Memoirs never became the law.‖  Marks, 430 U.S. at 
192 (describing the lower court‘s holding). 
On appeal, the Supreme Court rejected the Sixth 
Circuit‘s reasoning and articulated the following standard: 
―When a fragmented Court decides a case and no single 
rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five 
Justices, ‗the holding of the Court may be viewed as that 
position taken by those members who concurred in the 
judgments on the narrowest grounds . . . .‘‖  Id. at 193 
(quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976) 
(plurality opinion)).  Based on this reasoning, the Court 
concluded that because three Justices joined the plurality 
opinion and Justices Black and Douglas ―concurred on 
broader grounds,‖ ―[t]he view of the Memoirs plurality . . . 
constituted the holding of the Court and provided the 
governing standards.‖  Marks, 430 U.S. at 193–94. 
 As Marks demonstrates, the narrowest grounds rule is 
a necessary tool for deciphering the holding of the Court 
when there is no majority opinion.  See, e.g., Grutter v. 
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 325 (2003) (attempting to apply the 
Marks rule to derive a holding in the ―fractured decision‖ 
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 
265 (1978)).  Contrary to the Majority‘s holding today, 
neither Marks nor other Supreme Court decisions support the 
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―unprecedented argument that a statement of legal opinion 
joined by five Justices of th[e] Court does not carry the force 
of law,‖ Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 261 n.4 (1986).  
Rather, the narrowest grounds rule applies only to ―discern a 
single holding of the Court in cases in which no opinion on 
the issue in question has garnered the support of a majority.‖  
Id.; cf. Black‘s Law Dictionary 1201 (9th ed. 2009) (defining 
a ―majority opinion‖ as ―[a]n opinion joined in by more than 
half the judges considering a given case‖). 
Unable to find persuasive Supreme Court authority to 
buttress its novel reading of Marks, the Majority argues that 
our Court has ―applied the narrowest-grounds approach in 
circumstances beyond those posed by Marks, including to 
determine holdings in majority opinions.‖  Maj. Typescript at 
37–38 (footnotes, citation, and internal quotation marks 
omitted).  For support, the Majority cites our decisions in 
Horn v. Thoratec Corp., 376 F.3d 163 (3d Cir. 2004), and 
United States v. Bishop, 66 F.3d 569 (3d Cir. 1995).  Maj. 
Typescript at 39–42.  Neither case counsels the Majority‘s 
application of the narrowest-grounds doctrine to interpret 
Morse. 
In Horn, we looked to Justice Breyer‘s concurrence in 
Medtronic v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996), for guidance on how 
to address an issue central to our case, but that the Lohr Court 
discussed only in dicta.  See Horn, 376 F.3d at 175–76 
(comparing Justice Breyer‘s ―more narrow‖ view on 
preemption with ―Justice Stevens‘ sweeping pronouncement 
[in his plurality opinion] that [the statute at issue] almost 
never preempts a state common law claim‖).  Likewise, in 
Bishop, we cited Justice Kennedy‘s concurrence in United 
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), in order to reinforce the 
already established principle that courts must exercise ―‗great 
5 
restraint‘ before a court finds Congress to have overstepped 
its commerce power‖ despite Lopez‘s revolutionary holding.  
Bishop, 66 F.3d at 590 (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 568 
(Kennedy, J., concurring)).  Critically, in neither of these 
cases did we indicate a belief that a concurring Justice can 
create a new rule of law simply by both asking and answering 
a question left unaddressed by the majority opinion.  In fact, 
we noted that Justice Breyer‘s concurrence in Horn was 
particularly persuasive because ―Justice Breyer did not 
discuss issues in his concurring opinion that Justice Stevens, 
writing on behalf of the four-judge plurality, did not reach.‖  
Horn, 376 F.3d at 175.  That is not the case here.   
The Majority concedes that a concurring ―justice‘s 
opinion ‗cannot add to what the majority opinion holds‘ by 
‗binding the other four [j]ustices to what they have not said.‘‖  
Maj. Typescript at 39 (quoting McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 
U.S. 433, 462 n.3 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting)).  Yet by 
holding that Justice Alito‘s concurrence ―controls the 
majority opinion in Morse,‖ Maj. Typescript at 36, the 
Majority violates this very principle.  The majority in Morse 
noted that ―this is plainly not a case about political debate,‖ 
Morse, 551 U.S. at 403, and refused to address what the result 
of the case would have been had Frederick‘s banner been 
―political.‖  The Majority implies that Justice Alito‘s 
concurrence provides a definitive, ―controlling‖ answer to fill 
the void left by the Morse majority opinion, but the Supreme 
Court has disavowed this approach:  ―The Court would be in 
an odd predicament if a concurring minority of the Justices 
could force the majority to address a point they found it 
unnecessary (and did not wish) to address, under compulsion 
of [the dissent‘s] new principle that silence implies 
agreement.‖  Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 285 n.5 
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(2001).  Put another way, a majority ―holding is not made 
coextensive with the concurrence because [the majority] 
opinion does not expressly preclude (is ‗consistent with[]‘ . . 
.) the concurrence‘s approach.‖  Id. 
Notwithstanding the Majority‘s statement to the 
contrary, we have never applied the Marks rule to hold that a 
concurrence may co-opt an opinion joined by at least five 
Justices.  Rather, consistent with Marks, ―we have looked to 
the votes of dissenting Justices if they, combined with votes 
from plurality or concurring opinions, establish a majority 
view on the relevant issue.‖  United States v. Donovan, 661 
F.3d 174, 182 (3d Cir. 2011) (emphasis added); see also 
Student Pub. Interest Research Grp. of N.J., Inc. v. AT&T 
Bell Labs., 842 F.2d 1436, 1451 & n.16 (3d Cir. 1988).  In 
Donovan, we used Marks to analyze the Supreme Court‘s 
―fractured‖ decision in Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 
715 (2006), a case in which only three other Justices joined 
Justice Scalia‘s plurality opinion and four others dissented.  
Donovan, 661 F.3d at 179, 182.  Nowhere did we suggest that 
Marks would have been applicable had Rapanos featured a 
single majority opinion.  Likewise, in Planned Parenthood of 
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 947 F.2d 682 (3d Cir. 
1991), rev’d on other grounds, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), we held 
that Marks stands for the proposition that ―the controlling 
opinion in a splintered decision is that of the Justice or 
Justices who concur on the ‗narrowest grounds.‘‖  Casey, 947 
F.2d at 693 (emphasis added).  We then applied this principle 
while interpreting the Supreme Court‘s plurality decisions in 
Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490 
(1989), and Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990).  See 
Casey, 947 F.3d at 695–96 (noting that in Webster ―[t]he five 
Justices in the majority issued three opinions,‖ none of which 
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garnered five votes on the legal issue in dispute, and that 
―Hodgson was decided in a similar manner‖).  Once again, 
we gave no indication that Marks would have applied had 
five Justices or more joined the same opinion.  
 I also find it significant that, in the six years since 
Morse was decided, nine of ten appellate courts have cited as 
its holding the following standard articulated by Chief Justice 
Roberts in his opinion for the Court: ―[A] principal may, 
consistent with the First Amendment, restrict student speech 
at a school event, when that speech is reasonably viewed as 
promoting illegal drug use,‖ Morse, 551 U.S. at 403.1    Not 
                                              
1
 See Doninger v. Niehoff, 642 F.3d 334, 345 (2d Cir. 
2011) (―[T]he Supreme Court has determined that public 
schools may ‗take steps to safeguard those entrusted to their 
care from speech that can reasonably be regarded as 
encouraging illegal drug use‘ because of the special nature of 
the school environment and the dangers posed by student 
drug use.‖ (citations omitted)); Hardwick ex rel. Hardwick v. 
Heyward, 711 F.3d 426, 435 (4th Cir. 2013) (―[S]chool 
officials can regulate student speech that can plausibly be 
interpreted as promoting illegal drugs because of ‗the dangers 
of illegal drug use.‘‖ (citation omitted)); Defoe ex rel. Defoe 
v. Spiva, 625 F.3d 324, 332–33 (6th Cir. 2010) (―As this 
Court has already recognized, however, the Morse holding 
was a narrow one, determining no more than that a public 
school may prohibit student expression at school or at school-
sponsored events during school hours that can be ‗reasonably 
viewed as promoting drug use.‘‖ (citation omitted)); 
Zamecnik v. Indian Prairie Sch. Dist. No. 204, 636 F.3d 874, 
877 (7th Cir. 2011) (noting that promoting ―the use of illegal 
drugs, [is] a form of advocacy in the school setting that can be 
8 
one of these courts indicated that Justice Alito‘s concurrence 
controls, or that his dicta regarding ―political or social 
speech‖ altered or circumscribed the Court‘s holding in 
Morse.  We too have articulated the import of Morse 
consistent with these eight appellate courts: ―[I]n Morse, the 
Court held that ‗schools may take steps to safeguard those 
entrusted to their care from speech that can reasonably be 
regarded as encouraging illegal drug use.‘‖  K.A. ex rel. Ayers 
v. Pocono Mountain Sch. Dist., 710 F.3d 99, 107 (3d Cir. 
                                                                                                     
prohibited without evidence of disruption‖ (citation omitted)); 
D.J.M. ex rel. D.M. v. Hannibal Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 60, 647 
F.3d 754, 761 (8th Cir. 2011) (―Chief Justice Roberts 
reviewed the Court‘s approach in these prior decisions before 
holding ‗that schools may take steps to safeguard those 
entrusted to their care from speech that can reasonably be 
regarded as encouraging illegal drug use.‘‖ (citation 
omitted)); Redding v. Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1, 531 
F.3d 1071, 1094 (9th Cir. 2008), rev’d on other grounds, 557 
U.S. 364 (2009) (―[S]chools can ‗restrict student expression 
that they reasonably regard as promoting illegal drug use.‘‖ 
(citation omitted)); Corder v. Lewis Palmer Sch. Dist. No. 38, 
566 F.3d 1219, 1228 (10th Cir. 2009) (―[A] public school 
may prohibit student speech at school or at a school-
sponsored event during school hours that the school 
‗reasonably view[s] as promoting illegal drug use.‘‖ (citation 
omitted)); Boim v. Fulton Cnty. Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d 978, 984 
(11th Cir. 2007) (―[T]he special characteristics of the school 
environment and the governmental interest in stopping 
student drug abuse . . . allow schools to restrict student 
expression that they reasonably regard as promoting illegal 
drug use.‖ (citation omitted)). 
 
9 
2013) (citation omitted).
2
  This widespread consensus is 
further proof that Chief Justice Roberts‘s majority opinion, 
not Justice Alito‘s concurrence, is the controlling opinion in 
Morse. 
Before today, only the Fifth Circuit had held 
otherwise.  See Morgan v. Plano Indep. Sch. Dist., 589 F.3d 
740, 746 n.25 (5th Cir. 2009) (―We have held Justice Alito‘s 
concurrence to be the controlling opinion in Morse.‖ (citing 
Ponce v. Socorro Indep. Sch. Dist., 508 F.3d 765, 768 (5th 
Cir. 2007)); see also Morgan, 589 F.3d at 745 n.15 
(interpreting the holding in Morse to be ―that schools may 
regulate speech that a reasonable observer would interpret as 
advocating illegal drug use and that could not be interpreted 
as commenting on any political or social issue‖ (internal 
quotation marks omitted)).
3
  However, the Fifth Circuit did 
                                              
2
 The Majority cites our opinion in J.S. ex rel. Snyder 
v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915 (3d Cir. 2011), as 
evidence that we ―previously‖ had the ―intuition‖ that Justice 
Alito‘s concurrence controls the Supreme Court‘s opinion in 
Morse.  Maj. Typescript at 45 n.17.  But in J.S., as in K.A., we 
explicitly noted that the Supreme Court ―held that ‗the special 
characteristics of the school environment and the 
governmental interest in stopping drug abuse allow schools to 
restrict student expression that they reasonably regard as 
promoting illegal drug use.‘‖  650 F.3d at 927 (emphasis 
added) (quoting Morse, 551 U.S. at 408) (alterations, citation, 
and internal quotation marks omitted). 
 
3
 The Majority claims that both the Sixth Circuit and 
Tenth Circuit agree with the Fifth Circuit that Justice Alito‘s 
concurrence is controlling.  See Maj. Typescript at 45 n.17 
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not cite Marks or any other ―narrowest grounds‖ case and 
provided no justification to support its conclusion that Justice 
Alito‘s concurrence is the controlling opinion in Morse.  As 
the Seventh Circuit has aptly noted: 
The plaintiff calls Justice Alito‘s concurrence 
the ―controlling‖ opinion in Morse because 
Justices Alito and Kennedy were part of a five-
Justice majority, so that their votes were crucial 
to the decision.  But they joined the majority 
opinion, not just the decision, and by doing so 
they made it a majority opinion and not merely, 
as the plaintiff believes (as does the Fifth 
Circuit, Ponce v. Socorro Independent School 
                                                                                                     
(citing Barr v. Lafon, 538 F.3d 554, 564 (6th Cir. 2008), and 
Corder, 566 F.3d at 1228).  I disagree.  In Barr, the Sixth 
Circuit recognized Chief Justice Roberts‘s articulation that ―a 
public school may prohibit student speech at school or at a 
school-sponsored event during school hours that the school 
‗reasonably view[s] as promoting illegal drug use‘‖ as the 
Court‘s ―narrow holding.‖  538 F.3d at 564 (citation omitted).  
Although the opinion went on to discuss Justice Alito‘s 
concurrence, the Sixth Circuit never opined that the 
concurrence controls or otherwise modifies what the court 
had previously described as Morse‘s ―narrow holding.‖  See 
id.; see also Defoe, 625 F.3d at 332–33 & n.5 (describing the 
same ―narrow‖ holding in Morse before discussing Justice 
Alito‘s concurrence in a footnote).  The same can be said for 
the Tenth Circuit‘s decision in Corder, which essentially 
parrots Barr‘s description of Morse‘s majority opinion and 
Justice Alito‘s concurrence.  See Corder, 566 F.3d at 1228 
(quoting Barr, 538 F.3d at 564). 
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District, 508 F.3d 765, 768 (5th Cir. 2007)), a 
plurality opinion.  The concurring Justices 
wanted to emphasize that in allowing a school 
to forbid student speech that encourages the use 
of illegal drugs the Court was not giving 
schools carte blanche to regulate student 
speech.  And they were expressing their own 
view of the permissible scope of such 
regulation. 
Nuxoll ex rel. Nuxoll v. Indian Prarie Sch. Dist. # 204, 523 
F.3d 668, 673 (7th Cir. 2008) (emphasis added) (citation 
omitted).  This interpretation of the relationship between 
Justice Alito‘s concurrence and the majority opinion in Morse 
is the correct one because it is faithful to Marks and its 
progeny. 
For the reasons stated, I would not read Justice Alito‘s 
concurrence as altering or circumscribing a majority opinion 
for the Court that he joined in toto.  Thus, the Court‘s holding 
in Morse remains the familiar articulation that has been 
consistently stated, time and again, by this Court and eight 
other Courts of Appeals: ―[A] principal may, consistent with 
the First Amendment, restrict student speech at a school 
event, when that speech is reasonably viewed as promoting 
illegal drug use.‖  Morse, 551 U.S. at 403. 
B 
If Justice Alito‘s concurrence is not the ―controlling‖ 
opinion in Morse, the Majority has committed legal error by 
engrafting his dicta regarding ―social or political‖ 
commentary as a limitation upon the ability of schools to 
regulate speech that runs afoul of Fraser.  But even assuming, 
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arguendo, that Justice Alito‘s concurrence alters or 
circumscribes the Court‘s opinion in Morse, it is far from 
clear that it had anything to say about the realm Fraser carved 
out of Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School 
District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
Tinker established the general rule that ―student 
expression may not be suppressed unless school officials 
reasonably conclude that it will ‗materially and substantially 
disrupt the work and discipline of the school.‘‖  Morse, 551 
U.S. at 403 (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513); see also, e.g., 
Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 211 (3d Cir. 
2001).  Tinker‘s ―substantial disruption‖ test does not apply in 
every case, however.  As then-Judge Alito wrote when he was 
a member of this Court, ―the Supreme Court has carved out a 
number of narrow categories of speech that a school may 
restrict even without the threat of substantial disruption.‖  Id. 
at 212; see also J.S., 650 F.3d at 927 (emphasizing that the 
exceptions to Tinker are ―narrow‖).  First came Fraser, in 
which the Supreme Court held that schools may restrict the 
manner in which a student conveys his message by forbidding 
and punishing the use of lewd, vulgar, indecent, or plainly 
offensive speech.  See Fraser, 478 U.S. at 680–86.  Then, in 
Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 
(1988), the Court held that administrators may regulate 
speech that is school-sponsored or could reasonably be 
viewed as the school‘s own speech.  Id. at 272–73.  Most 
recently, in Morse the Court held that ―schools may take steps 
to safeguard those entrusted to their care from speech that can 
reasonably be regarded as encouraging illegal drug use.‖  
Morse, 551 U.S. at 397. 
As these cases indicate, ―[s]ince Tinker, every 
Supreme Court decision looking at student speech has 
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expanded the kinds of speech schools can regulate.‖  Palmer 
ex rel. Palmer v. Waxahachie Indep. Sch. Dist., 579 F.3d 502, 
507 (5th Cir. 2009); cf. Morse, 551 U.S. at 417 (Thomas, J., 
concurring) (observing that ―the Court has since scaled back 
Tinker‘s standard, or rather set the standard aside on an ad 
hoc basis‖).  In derogation of this consistent trend, the 
Majority makes us the first United States Court of Appeals to 
suggest that Morse has circumscribed Fraser, thereby 
limiting the ability of teachers and administrators to regulate 
student speech. 
In addition to overriding the careful steps taken to 
allow schools to regulate student speech since Tinker, the 
Majority errs by placing Morse at the center of a case that has 
nothing whatsoever to do with illegal drug use.  That Morse is 
not central to this case is borne out by the way the case was 
litigated and adjudicated.  The District Court concluded that 
only the standards of Tinker and Fraser are implicated, and 
neither party ever argued otherwise.  See B.H. v. Easton Area 
Sch. Dist., 827 F. Supp. 2d 392, 394 (E.D. Pa. 2011) (―The 
two Supreme Court cases examining student speech that are 
most relevant to this case are Fraser and Tinker.‖).  The 
School District primarily contends that the ―I ♥ boobies!‖ 
bracelets are proscribable because they express sexual 
innuendo that can reasonably be classified in the middle 
school context as lewd, vulgar, and indecent speech.  
Plaintiffs rejoin that the word ―boobies‖ is neither inherently 
sexual nor vulgar, especially when conspicuously tied to 
breast cancer awareness.  Until the case reached the en banc 
Court, no party or judge had suggested that Morse provided 
the governing standard for this dispute.  And rightly so, 
because this is a Fraser case, not a Morse case, and there are 
critical differences between the two. 
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Courts have recognized, time and again, that the three 
exceptions to Tinker‘s general rule are independent ―carve-
outs.‖  See, e.g., Saxe, 240 F.3d at 212–14.  The Supreme 
Court has given no indication—either in Morse or any of its 
subsequent decisions—that it has modified the standard, first 
articulated in Fraser more than 25 years ago, that governs 
how schools are to regulate speech they may reasonably deem 
lewd, vulgar, indecent, or plainly offensive.  Moreover, 
although the appellate courts have had dozens of 
opportunities to do so, no court has suggested that Morse 
qualified Fraser in any way.  Since Morse, we have had 
occasion to consider Fraser and have consistently 
―interpreted [it] to permit school officials to regulate ‗lewd, 
vulgar, indecent, and plainly offensive speech in school.‘‖  
J.S., 650 F.3d at 927 (quoting Saxe, 240 F.3d at 213) 
(emphasis and internal quotation marks omitted); see also 
K.A., 710 F.3d at 107 (―In [Fraser], the Court held that 
schools may restrict the manner in which a student conveys 
his message by forbidding and punishing the use of lewd, 
vulgar, indecent, and plainly offensive speech.‖ (citation 
omitted)); Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 
650 F.3d 205, 212–13 (3d Cir. 2011) (same). 
In fact, the appellate opinions addressing Morse, 
Fraser, and Kuhlmeier treat them as independent analytical 
constructs that permit schools to regulate certain types of 
speech that would otherwise be protected under Tinker.  See, 
e.g., Hardwick, 711 F.3d at 435 n.11 (―[W]e must continue to 
adhere to the Tinker test in cases that do not fall within any 
exceptions that the Supreme Court has created until the Court 
directs otherwise.‖); Doninger, 642 F.3d at 353–54 
(―[B]ecause the t-shirts were not vulgar, could not reasonably 
be perceived to bear the School‘s imprimatur, and did not 
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encourage drug use, they could be subject to regulation 
different from that permissible for adults in non-school 
settings only if they threatened substantial disruption to the 
work and discipline of the School.‖ (citations omitted)).  It is 
especially notable that even the Fifth Circuit, which 
mistakenly held that Justice Alito‘s concurrence in Morse is 
―controlling,‖ continues to treat the Tinker carve-outs as 
independent exceptions rather than overlapping categories of 
proscribable speech.  See Morgan, 589 F.3d at 745 n.15 (5th 
Cir. 2009) (characterizing Fraser as ―holding schools may 
prohibit lewd, vulgar, obscene or plainly offensive student 
speech‖ and, in the same string citation, separately 
characterizing Morse as ―holding that schools may regulate 
speech ‗that a reasonable observer would interpret as 
advocating illegal drug use‘ and that could not be ‗interpreted 
as commenting on any political or social issue‘‖ (citations 
omitted)).  The Majority‘s own analysis demonstrates that 
threshold questions in a school speech case are whether the 
speech at issue is governed by one of the three Tinker carve-
outs and, if not, whether the school acted properly under 
Tinker.  See Maj. Typescript at 63–64. 
In addition, we have emphasized that the carve-outs 
touch on ―several narrow categories of speech that a school 
may restrict even without the threat of substantial disruption.‖  
K.A., 710 F.3d at 107 (emphasis added) (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  This does not mean, as the Majority 
suggests, that the carve-outs narrow one another.  See Maj. 
Typescript at 45 n.17 (citing J.S., 650 F.3d at 927).  Rather, it 
is simply a recognition that they are narrow within their 
separate spheres.  Indeed, courts have been especially careful 
to underscore the narrowness of the Court‘s holding in Morse.  
See, e.g., Defoe, 625 F.3d at 332–33 (―[T]he Morse holding 
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was a narrow one, determining no more than that a public 
school may prohibit student expression at school or at school-
sponsored events during school hours that can be ‗reasonably 
viewed as promoting drug use.‘‖ (emphasis added) (citation 
omitted)); Barr, 538 F.3d at 564 (same); B.W.A. v. 
Farmington R-7 Sch. Dist., 554 F.3d 734, 741 (8th Cir. 2009) 
(same). 
In J.S., we too recognized the ―narrowness of the 
Court‘s holding‖ in Morse.  J.S., 650 F.3d at 927.4  There, we 
declared that Morse did not apply to a school‘s punishment of 
a student for creating a MySpace profile using graphic 
language and imagery to disparage her teacher, see J.S., 650 
F.3d at 932 n.10 (―Indisputably, neither Kuhlmeier nor Morse 
governs this case.‖).  Instead, we indicated that ―the only way 
for the punishment to pass constitutional muster is if . . . J.S.‘s 
speech can be prohibited under the Fraser exception to 
Tinker.‖  Id. at 931–32.  If the proper standard under Fraser is 
the Majority‘s formulation of whether a student‘s lewd 
speech may ―plausibly be interpreted as commenting on a 
social or political issue,‖ surely we would have considered 
                                              
4
 The Majority believes that this clause serves as an 
indicator that Justice Alito‘s concurrence narrowed the 
holding in Morse and, in turn, narrowed the speech that 
schools can proscribe under Fraser.  See Maj. Typescript at 
45 n.17.  Contrary to the Majority‘s implication, in J.S. we 
neither addressed Justice Alito‘s discussion of student speech 
that touches on matters plausibly related to a social or 
political issue nor indicated a belief that his concurrence 
somehow modified the Morse Court‘s majority opinion, 
which we quoted verbatim as the Court‘s holding.  See J.S., 
650 F.3d at 927. 
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whether J.S.‘s online profile touched on any such issue.  
Instead of doing so, we applied the Fraser test while 
disavowing the relevance of Morse. 
The fact that courts have maintained analytical 
separation among the different Tinker carve-outs makes sense 
because the Supreme Court created each one for a unique 
purpose.  In K.A. we addressed these ―vital interests that 
enable school officials to exercise control over student speech 
even in the absence of a substantial disruption.‖  K.A., 710 
F.3d at 107.  The vital interest at issue in Morse that ―allow[s] 
schools to restrict student expression that they reasonably 
regard as promoting illegal drug use‖ is ―the special 
characteristics of the school environment, and the 
governmental interest in stopping student drug abuse.‖  Id. 
(quoting Morse, 551 U.S. at 408).  Fraser allowed schools to 
punish ―lewd, indecent, or offensive speech,‖ 478 U.S. at 683, 
to further ―society‘s . . . interest in teaching students the 
boundaries of socially appropriate behavior,‖ K.A., 710 F.3d 
at 107 (quoting Fraser, 478 U.S. at 681).  And in Kuhlmeier, 
the interest that ―entitle[s] [educators] to exercise greater 
control over [school-sponsored publications]‖ is ―to assure 
that participants learn whatever lessons the activity is 
designed to teach, that readers or listeners are not exposed to 
material that may be inappropriate for their level of maturity, 
and that the views of the individual speaker are not 
erroneously attributed to the school.‖  K.A., 710 F.3d at 107 
(quoting Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 271).  The Court‘s 
willingness to curtail the First Amendment rights of students  
to enable schools to achieve these important goals vindicates 
the principle that ―the rights of students ‗must be applied in 
light of the special characteristics of the school 
environment.‘‖  Morse, 551 U.S. at 397 (quoting Kuhlmeier, 
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484 U.S. at 266).  Because each case was intended to address 
a separate concern, I disagree with the Majority that language 
qualifying one type of carve-out applies equally to the others. 
In sum, Morse‘s ―narrow‖ holding does not apply 
unless a school has regulated student speech that it viewed as 
advocating illegal drug use.  Notwithstanding its critical 
reliance on Morse, at one point the Majority seems to agree 
that Morse does not apply to this case when it states that ―no 
one could reasonably interpret the bracelets as advocating 
illegal drug use.‖  Maj. Typescript at 64.  The Majority can‘t 
have it both ways.  The decision to engraft Justice Alito‘s 
Morse concurrence onto Fraser erodes the analytical 
distinction between the two lines of cases and turns this 
appeal into some sort of Fraser/Morse hybrid.  ―The law 
governing restrictions on student speech can be difficult and 
confusing, even for lawyers, law professors, and judges.  The 
relevant Supreme Court cases can be hard to reconcile, and 
courts often struggle to determine which standard applies in 
any particular case.‖  Doninger, 642 F.3d at 353.  By using 
Morse to modify the distinct carve-out established in Fraser, 
the Majority has muddied the waters and further encumbered 
the ability of educators to run their schools. 
 The Majority attempts to make more palatable its 
decision to engraft Morse‘s supposed prohibition of ―any 
restriction of speech that can plausibly be interpreted as 
commenting on any political or social issue‖ onto Fraser.  
For instance, it claims that ―the [Supreme] Court did not 
believe that Fraser‘s speech could plausibly be interpreted as 
political or social commentary.‖  Maj. Typescript at 27.  By 
claiming that such an interpretation of Matthew Fraser‘s 
―speech nominating a fellow student for student elective 
office,‖ Fraser, 478 U.S. at 677, is wholly ―implausible,‖ the 
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Majority demonstrates the difficulties that arise when it 
blends together the disparate Tinker carve-outs. 
As the Majority rightly notes, the Fraser Court opined 
that there was a ―marked distinction between the political 
‗message‘ of the armbands in Tinker and the sexual content of 
Fraser‘s speech.‖  Maj. Typescript at 28–29 (quoting Fraser, 
478 U.S. at 680).  That does not mean, however, that it was 
implausible to conclude that Fraser‘s speech was political.  If 
it were truly implausible to ―interpret[] [Fraser‘s speech] as 
commenting on any political or social issue,‖ one must 
wonder why the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit characterized Fraser‘s speech as ―student political 
speech-making‖ and a ―campaign speech[].‖  Fraser v. Bethel 
Sch. Dist. No. 403, 755 F.2d 1356, 1363 (9th Cir. 1985), 
rev’d, 478 U.S. 675 (1986); id. at 1368 (Wright, J., 
dissenting).  The three appellate judges who heard Fraser‘s 
case were deemed by the Supreme Court to have erred when 
they likened his speech to Tinker‘s armband, but that does not 
mean that it was ―implausible‖ for those three judges to view 
Fraser‘s speech as political.  It was, after all, a campaign 
speech. 
 A brief hypothetical further demonstrates the problems 
posed by the Majority‘s plausibility-based articulation of the 
Fraser carve-out.  Suppose a student makes a speech at a 
school assembly.  Like Matthew Fraser‘s speech, the content 
is about supporting a candidate for office, but the sexual 
references are muted enough such that the Majority would 
deem them ―ambiguously lewd‖ instead of ―plainly lewd.‖  If 
the student‘s speech is about a classmate running for school 
office, the Majority would say that the school may punish the 
speaker.  But if an identical speech is given and the 
classmate‘s name is replaced with the name of a candidate for 
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president, mayor, or even school board, the Majority would 
conclude that the First Amendment insulates the student‘s 
speech.  In my view, the two speeches are indistinguishable 
under Fraser. 
In sum, the Majority‘s approach vindicates any speech 
cloaked in a political or social message even if a reasonable 
observer could deem it lewd, vulgar, indecent, or plainly 
offensive.  In both cases, the inappropriate language is 
identical, but the speech is constitutionally protected as long 
as it meets the Majority‘s cramped definition of ―politics‖ or 
its as-yet-undefined notion of what constitutes ―social 
commentary.‖  Fraser repudiated this very idea.  ―The First 
Amendment guarantees wide freedom in matters of adult 
public discourse . . . .  It does not follow, however, that 
simply because the use of an offensive form of expression 
may not be prohibited to adults making what the speaker 
considers a political point, the same latitude must be 
permitted to children in a public school.‖   Fraser, 478 U.S. at 
682 (emphasis added). 
II 
 As noted, the Majority holds that ―Fraser . . . permits a 
school to categorically restrict ambiguous speech that a 
reasonable observer could interpret as having a lewd, vulgar, 
or profane meaning,‖ but only ―so long as it could not also 
plausibly be interpreted as commenting on a social or political 
issue.‖  Maj. Typescript at 61.  It is important to emphasize 
here that, despite my disagreement with the second part of the 
Majority‘s formulation, I agree fully with its understanding of 
the objective-reasonableness inquiry compelled under Fraser.  
See Maj. Typescript 32–35 (discussing why ―courts should 
defer to a school‘s decisions to restrict what a reasonable 
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observer would interpret as lewd, vulgar, profane, or 
offensive‖).5 
                                              
5
 Though I believe an objective-reasonableness test is 
the correct interpretation of Fraser, its level of generality 
leaves something to be desired, particularly when one 
considers that the lower courts will look to our decision for 
guidance.  The Majority states that ―[i]t remains the job of 
judges . . . to determine whether a reasonable observer could 
interpret student speech as lewd, profane, vulgar, or 
offensive.‖  Maj. Typescript at 33–34.  But who is this 
―reasonable observer‖?  The Majority gives us clues: he 
―would not adopt an acontextual interpretation‖ and would 
consider ―the plausibility of the school‘s interpretation in 
light of competing meanings; the context, content, and form 
of the speech; and the age and maturity of the students.‖  Maj. 
Typescript at 34.  I would add several more considerations.  
Most importantly, evolving societal norms counsel that what 
is ―objectively‖ considered ―lewd, profane, vulgar, or 
offensive‖ one day may not be so the next.  See, e.g., Fraser, 
478 U.S. at 691 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (―‗Frankly, my dear, 
I don‘t give a damn.‘  When I was a high school student, the 
use of those words in a public forum shocked the Nation.  
Today Clark Gable‘s four-letter expletive is less offensive 
than it was then.‖).  Furthermore, given the diversity of 
opinions and perspectives across our country, the type of 
speech that may reasonably fall into one of the proscribable 
categories would vary widely from one community to the 
next.  These considerations highlight the importance of 
ensuring that ―the determination of what manner of speech in 
the classroom or in school assembly is inappropriate properly 
rests with the school board.‖  Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683. 
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The Majority did not find that the school‘s 
interpretation of the bracelets‘ message as lewd was 
objectively unreasonable.  See Maj. Typescript at 63 n.22 
(―[W]e need not determine whether a reasonable observer 
could interpret the bracelets‘ slogan as lewd.‖).  Thus, had the 
Majority not engrafted Justice Alito‘s concurrence in Morse 
onto the Fraser standard, my colleagues might agree that the 
school did not violate the First Amendment when it 
proscribed the bracelet.  Because the Majority chose not to 
analyze whether the school was reasonable in determining 
that the bracelet could be proscribed under Fraser, however, I 
will briefly discuss why that is so.  
In this close case, the ―I ♥ boobies! (KEEP A 
BREAST)‖ bracelets would seem to fall into a gray area 
between speech that is plainly lewd and merely indecorous.  
Because I think it objectively reasonable to interpret the 
bracelets, in the middle school context, as inappropriate 
sexual innuendo and double entendre, I would reverse the 
judgment of the District Court and vacate the preliminary 
injunction. 
The District Court correctly ascertained the standard of 
review to apply in a case that arises under Fraser, but 
proceeded to misapply that standard.  First, by emphasizing 
whether Plaintiffs intended a vulgar or sexual meaning in 
their ―I ♥ boobies!‖ bracelets and determining that a non-
sexual, breast-cancer-awareness interpretation of the bracelets 
was reasonable, the Court inverted the proper question.  
Instead of asking whether it was reasonable to view the 
bracelets as an innocuous expression of breast cancer 
awareness, the District Court should have asked whether the 
school officials‘ interpretation of the bracelets—i.e., as 
expressing sexual attraction to breasts—was reasonable.  So 
23 
long as the School District‘s interpretation was objectively 
reasonable, the ban did not contravene the First Amendment 
or our school-speech jurisprudence. 
Second, in its substantive conclusion that ―I ♥ 
boobies!‖ cannot reasonably be regarded as lewd or vulgar, 
the District Court highlighted the bracelets‘ social value while 
disregarding their likely meaning to immature middle-
schoolers.
6
  As the School District argues, the fact that 
                                              
6
 In fact, we have questioned the applicability of the 
Supreme Court‘s student speech jurisprudence in the 
elementary and middle school settings: 
 
[A]t a certain point, a school child is so young 
that it might reasonably be presumed the First 
Amendment does not protect the kind of speech 
at issue here.  Where that point falls is subject 
to reasonable debate. 
 
In any event, if third graders enjoy rights under 
Tinker, those rights will necessarily be very 
limited.  Elementary school officials will 
undoubtedly be able to regulate much—perhaps 
most—of the speech that is protected in higher 
grades.  When officials have a legitimate 
educational reason—whether grounded on the 
need to preserve order, to facilitate learning or 
social development, or to protect the interests of 
other students—they may ordinarily regulate 
public elementary school children‘s speech. 
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Plaintiffs‘ laudable awareness message could be discerned 
from the bracelets does not render the School District‘s ban 
unconstitutional.  ―I ♥ boobies!‖ not only expresses support 
for those afflicted with breast cancer, but also conveys a 
sexual attraction to the female breast. 
It is true that certain facts indicate that a sexual 
interpretation of the ―I ♥ boobies!‖ bracelets may be at the 
outer edge of how a reasonable observer would interpret 
speech.  Most obviously, the bracelets always modify the ―I ♥ 
boobies!‖ phrase with ―(KEEP A BREAST)‖ or other breast-
cancer-awareness messages.  ―When one reads the entire 
                                                                                                     
Walker-Serrano ex rel. Walker v. Leonard, 325 F.3d 412, 
417–18 (3d Cir. 2003); see also Walz ex rel. Walz v. Egg 
Harbor Twp. Bd. of Educ., 342 F.3d 271, 276 (3d Cir. 2003) 
(noting that ―the age of the students bears an important 
inverse relationship to the degree and kind of control a school 
may exercise: as a general matter, the younger the students, 
the more control a school may exercise‖).  Other appellate 
courts share our misgivings, noting that ―the younger the 
children, the more latitude the school authorities have in 
limiting expression.‖  Zamecnik, 636 F.3d at 876 (citing 
Muller ex rel. Muller v. Jefferson Lighthouse Sch., 98 F.3d 
1530, 1538–39 (7th Cir. 1996)); see also Nuxoll, 523 F.3d at 
673 (when a school regulates the speech of children that are 
―very young . . . the school has a pretty free hand‖); Morgan, 
659 F.3d at 386 (―[I]n public schools, the speech appropriate 
for eighteen-year-old high school students is not necessarily 
acceptable for seven-year-old grammar school students.  
Indeed, common sense dictates that a 7-year-old is not a 13-
year-old, and neither is an adult.‖ (alterations, citations, and 
internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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phrase, it is clearly a message designed to promote breast 
cancer awareness.‖  K.J. v. Sauk Prairie Sch. Dist., No. 11-
cv-622, slip op. at 14 (W.D. Wis. Feb. 6, 2012).  
Additionally, school administrators did not immediately 
recognize the bracelets as vulgar or lewd; students had been 
wearing the bracelets for two months before they were 
banned, and teachers had to request guidance on whether and 
how to deal with the bracelets.  Moreover, the school itself 
was compelled to use the word ―boobies‖ over the public 
address system and school television station in order to 
describe the proscribed bracelets, which suggests that the 
word alone is not patently offensive. 
Notwithstanding the facts supporting Plaintiffs‘ case, I 
conclude that ―I ♥ boobies!‖ can reasonably be interpreted as 
inappropriate sexual double entendre.  In the middle school 
context, the phrase can mean both ―I support breast-cancer-
awareness measures‖ and ―I am attracted to female breasts.‖  
Many twelve- and thirteen-year-old children are susceptible 
to juvenile sexualization of messages that would be 
innocuous to a reasonable adult.  Indeed, at least one bracelet-
wearer acknowledged that ―immature‖ boys might read a 
lewd meaning into the bracelets and conceded that she 
understood why the school might want to ban the bracelets, 
B.H., 827 F. Supp. 2d at 399, and other students parroted the 
phrase on the bracelets while conveying sexual attraction to 
breasts.  Another school administrator has concluded that the 
bracelets at issue here ―elicit attention by sexualizing the 
cause of breast cancer awareness.‖  Sauk Prairie, No. 11-cv-
622, at 4.  And as Judge Crabb, the only other federal judge to 
consider these bracelets, put it in Sauk Prairie, ―hints of 
vulgarity and sexuality‖ in the bracelets ―attract attention and 
provoke conversation, a ploy that is effective for [KABF‘s] 
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target audience of immature middle [school] students.‖  Id. at 
15.  Finally, as the Gender Equality amicus brief points out, 
breasts are ubiquitously sexualized in American culture. 
The Easton Area Middle School principals‘ 
willingness to say ―boobies‖ to the entire school audience 
does not imply that the word does not have a sexual meaning; 
it merely suggests that ―boobies‖ is not plainly lewd.  
Moreover, although KABF‘s decision not to market its 
products through porn stars and at truck stops is laudable, the 
interest such organizations have shown in the bracelets is 
further evidence that the bracelets are read by many to 
contain a sexual meaning.  And the ―I ♥ boobies!‖ bracelets‘ 
breast cancer message is not so obvious or overwhelming as 
to eliminate the double entendre.  For one thing, the bracelets 
come in many colors other than the shade of pink widely 
associated with the fight against breast cancer. 
Additionally, although Plaintiffs and their amici argue 
that the casual language of the ―I ♥ boobies!‖ bracelets is 
intended to make breast cancer issues more accessible and 
less stigmatized for girls and young women, that purpose 
does not undermine the plausibility of a sexual interpretation 
of the bracelets.  Nor does the fact that these Plaintiffs‘ 
mothers were happy not only to purchase the bracelets for 
their teenage daughters but also to wear them render the 
bracelets immune from school regulation.  The mothers‘ 
intent that the bracelets convey a breast-cancer-awareness 
message, like Plaintiffs‘ own subjective motive, is irrelevant 
to interpreting the meaning of the speech.  
Likewise, the School District administrators‘ 
subjective beliefs, expressed at the time of the ban and later 
during this litigation, do not affect my determination of 
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whether it is objectively reasonable to infer a sexualized 
meaning from the bracelets.  Their failure to use the words 
―lewd,‖ ―vulgar,‖ ―indecent,‖ or ―plainly offensive‖ is not 
fatal to their claim of regulatory authority.  Similarly, some 
principals‘ inconsistent testimony regarding what other 
breast-cancer-related phrases they might censor does not 
make the phrase at issue here more or less vulgar.  Therefore, 
it is not probative that administrators intermittently indicated 
that they thought the word ―breast‖ by itself has an 
impermissible sexual connotation. 
Plaintiffs rely on the initial statements by teachers at 
the middle school that the word ―breast‖ alone in any context 
and the phrases ―breast cancer awareness‖ and ―keep-a-
breast.org‖ could also be banned to argue that the School 
District has left them no other means to convey their breast-
cancer-awareness message.  But those words were not 
banned—indeed, students are permitted to wear KABF‘s 
―check y♥urself!! (KEEP A BREAST)‖ bracelets—and the 
administrators changed their position prior to the evidentiary 
hearing, opining that such phrases would not be inappropriate 
at school.  Also significant is the fact that the Easton Area 
Middle School has not stifled the message of breast cancer 
awareness; in the course of a robust breast cancer awareness 
campaign it merely imposed a permissible restriction on the 
way in which that message may be expressed.  See Saxe, 240 
F.3d at 213 (―Fraser speaks to the form and manner of 
student speech, not its substance.  It addresses the mode of 
expression, not its content or viewpoint.‖ (citation omitted)). 
Nor is Plaintiffs‘ position saved by the fact that the ―I 
♥ boobies!‖ phrase was ―chosen to enhance the effectiveness 
of the communication to the target audience.‖  B.H., 827 F. 
Supp. 2d at 406.  The District Court‘s focus on the strategic 
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purpose of the words and format used in the bracelets was 
misguided.  If indecency were permitted in schools merely 
because it was intended to advance some laudable goal, 
Matthew Fraser‘s speech would have been constitutionally 
protected insofar as he intended to win the attention of his 
classmates while advocating the election of his friend. 
Finally, if we were to hold that the breast cancer 
message here makes any sexual reading of the bracelets 
unreasonable, schools would be obliged to permit more 
egregiously sexual advocacy messages.  As Ms. DiVietro 
acknowledged, ―other bodily parts in the human anatomy . . . 
can get cancer and . . . other types of slang terms‖ would have 
to be condoned.  App. 275.  DiVietro raised the specter of an 
―I ♥ Balls‖ slogan to support testicular cancer awareness.  Id. 
at 275–76.  These examples are not speculative.  The 
Testicular Cancer Awareness Project sells ―feelmyballs‖ 
bracelets to encourage male self-examinations and general 
awareness.  See Testicular Cancer Awareness Project, 
http://www.feelmyballs.org/shop/front.php (last visited June 
3, 2013).  If middle school students have a constitutional right 
to wear ―I ♥ boobies!‖ bracelets, it would be difficult to 
articulate a limiting principle that would disallow these other 
catchy phrases, so long as they were aimed at some socially 
beneficial objective. 
Simply stated, the District Court correctly articulated 
the proper standard of review to be applied in cases that 
implicate Fraser (such as this one), but it strayed from that 
standard when evaluating the reasonableness of Plaintiffs‘ 
intended meaning.  For that reason, and because the School 
District‘s reading of ―I ♥ boobies!‖ as inappropriate sexual 
double entendre was a reasonable interpretation in the middle 
school context, I would hold that Plaintiffs cannot 
29 
demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits of their 
claim.  Accordingly, the District Court abused its discretion in 
granting a preliminary injunction. 
*  *  * 
As this case demonstrates, running a school is more 
complicated now than ever before.  Administrators and 
teachers are not only obliged to teach core subjects, but also 
find themselves mired in a variety of socio-political causes 
during school time.  And they do so in an era when they no 
longer possess plenary control of their charges as they did 
when they acted in loco parentis.  See, e.g., Morse, 551 U.S. 
at 413–16 (Thomas, J., concurring).  The decisions school 
administrators must make regarding the deportment of their 
students—what they say, what they wear, or what they do—
require common sense and good judgment.  Many of those 
decisions will involve matters about which reasonable people 
can disagree.  In the close cases, such as this one, there is 
virtue in deferring to the reasonable judgments of those 
responsible for educating our nation‘s youth.  With respect, I 
dissent. 
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GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge, dissenting, with whom 
CHAGARES, JORDAN, HARDIMAN and GREENBERG, 
join. 
 My colleagues have determined today that “I ♥ 
boobies” is an ambiguous phrase that may connote an 
attraction to female breasts, but which falls under the 
protection of the First Amendment in the middle school 
context because it may plausibly be interpreted as 
commenting on a political or social issue.  Reasonable minds 
may come to varying conclusions on this test, but one thing is 
not open to debate: a school district faced with the same 
dilemma in the coming weeks, months, or years is given no 
greater guidance regarding its ability to determine whether a 
particular message may be proscribed than before the 
Majority opinion issued.   
 The Majority lauds the intent of the two middle 
schoolers responsible for introducing “I ♥ boobies! (KEEP A 
BREAST)” bracelets into their school, which encouraged 
serious discussion regarding a medical issue of increasing 
social import.  Appellees‟ actions may or may not reflect an 
admirable maturity, but the intent of Appellees is not at issue.  
In many cases, when the First Amendment is implicated, the 
intent of the speakers will be admirable or at worst benign.  
The Majority concludes that, as long as the ambiguous speech 
may be interpreted by a reasonable person as plausibly related 
to a political or social issue, it is protected.  Despite its 
express disavowal of intent as a consideration, the Majority 
inadvertently re-injects the students‟ intent into the fray by 
mandating an analysis of whether a political or social issue is 
addressed by the speech.  This is improper but it is not my 
sole criticism. 
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  The Majority‟s test leaves school districts essentially 
powerless to exercise any discretion and extends the First 
Amendment‟s protection to a breadth that knows no bounds.  
As such, how will similarly-situated school districts apply this 
amorphous test going forward?  The Majority‟s test has two 
obvious flaws.  First, what words or phrases fall outside of the 
ambiguous designation other than the “seven dirty words”?  
Second, how does a school district ever assess the weight or 
validity of political or social commentary?  The absence of 
guidance on both of these questions leaves school districts to 
scratch their heads.   
 Practical problems with the Majority‟s test abound.  
Where and how do school districts line-draw regarding the 
nouns used to describe the subject matter of the particular 
awareness campaign?  The Majority has established that at 
opposite ends of the spectrum are “boobies,” on the one hand, 
and “tits,” one of the “seven dirty words,” on the other hand.  
What lies between those two extremes and how a school 
district is to make a principled judgment going forward 
remain open questions.  No doubt, there are some words and 
phrases that all would agree should be afforded no protection 
in the middle school context, despite their use in promoting 
an important social issue.  My recalcitrance to extend First 
Amendment protection to the slogan at hand is simple — why 
is this word, “boobies,” different?  Why does it deserve 
protection?  Is “boobies” a term that is inherently innocuous 
or sophomoric, as the Majority asserts?  As noted in the 
Majority, “ta tas” is used as the descriptive term in some 
breast cancer awareness campaigns.  The ambiguity of “ta 
tas” in this context is beyond question.  What also seems 
beyond question is that the school district, according to the 
Majority, must lay dormant to a student‟s use of “ta tas” or 
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any synonym of “breast” (other than “tits”) as long as the 
student is commenting on a political or social issue, here, 
breast cancer awareness.  The lack of certitude or a workable 
parameter unnecessarily handcuffs school districts. 
 What of the circumstance when an anatomically 
correct term is used in an awareness campaign?  Applying the 
Majority‟s test, “I ♥ penises,”  “I ♥ vaginas,”  “I ♥ testicles,” 
or “I ♥ breasts” would apparently be phrases or slogans that 
school districts would be powerless to address.  Would the 
invocation of any of these slogans in a cancer awareness 
effort fail to garner protection under the Majority‟s test?  It 
would appear not.  What of the other slogans that the 
Majority mentions in its opinion that are sufficiently 
ambiguous?  The Majority blithely states that “it does not 
enjoin the School District‟s regulation of other types of 
apparel, such as the „Save the ta-tas‟ T-shirt or testicular-
cancer-awareness apparel bearing the phrase 
„feelmyballs.org.‟”  (Maj. Op. 71.)  This is exactly my 
concern.  What may a school district do?  These phrases are 
both ambiguous and speak to political and social issues.  How 
is a school district now better able to discern when it may 
exercise its discretion to impede the use of a particular slogan, 
as it relates to an awareness program, than before the issuance 
of this opinion? 
 The other practical problem which arises from 
application of the Majority‟s test is judging the validity of 
political and social comment.  In the context of these social 
awareness campaigns, when would the students‟ involvement 
not invoke political or social comment?  The constriction of 
“plausibly be interpreted as” adds little to our discourse.  For 
instance, when would a student using a term that is admittedly 
ambiguous not be able to assert that the use of the offending 
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word, term, or phrase is speech that is commenting on a 
political or social issue?  What is the balancing that a school 
district can/should/may engage in to determine the merit or 
value of the proposed political or social comment?  The 
unabashed invocation of a lewd, vulgar, indecent or plainly 
offensive term is not what is at issue here; what is at issue is 
the notion that we have established a test which effectively 
has no parameters.  The political or social issue prong entirely 
eviscerates the school district‟s authority to effectively 
evaluate whether the student‟s speech is indeed protected.  
This shortcoming in the application of the test exemplifies its 
inherent weakness — a failure to resolve the conundrum 
school districts face every day. 
 In light of the Majority‟s approach, school districts 
seeking guidance from our First Amendment jurisprudence in 
this context will find only confusion.  I cannot adhere to this 
approach.  I respectfully dissent.  
